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Macroeconomics and Financial Economics

IJCI-2017-31808

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Promoción del Talento y su Empleabilidad en I+D+i
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Incorporación
Convocatoria Juan de la Cierva Incorporación
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario CENTRE DE RECERCA EN ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answer is no; we provide conditions under which information aggregation necessarily fails. In another region of the parameter space, aggregating and non-aggregating equilibria coexist. We solve for the optimal information policy of a social planner who observes trading behavior. We show that non-aggregating equilibria are always constrained inefficient. The optimal information policy Pareto improves upon the laissez-faire outcome by concealing information about trading volume when it is sufficiently high., Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Juan de la Cierva (IJCI-2017-31808), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya AGAUR Grant (SGR 2017-1393). Fuchs acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answer is no; we provide conditions under which information aggregation necessarily fails. In another region of the parameter space, aggregating and non-aggregating equilibria coexist. We solve for the optimal information policy of a social planner who observes trading behavior. We show that non-aggregating equilibria are always constrained inefficient. The optimal information policy Pareto improves upon the laissez-faire outcome by concealing information about trading volume when it is sufficiently high., Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Juan de la Cierva (IJCI-2017-31808), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya AGAUR Grant (SGR 2017-1393). Fuchs acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575.