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OBJETIVIDAD-SUBJETIVIDAD EN EL CONOCIMIENTO Y EN LA REPRESENTACION SINGULAR

FFI2015-63892-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2015
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The second person perspective

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule., This research has been generously supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research Projects FFI2016‐80588‐R and FFI2015‐63892‐P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), as well as the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Explaining public action

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and suggest that acknowledgement of this level highlights two important amendments of contemporary views. First, sceptics must accept that, when explanation is attitude-involving, the attitudes mentioned in the explanation of action must refer to the agent. Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, proponents of the de se should seek for accounts of de se attitudes that are not confined to a specific agent and are, therefore, sharable across agents., This work has received financial support from the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia) and the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research projects FFI2016-80588-R and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reasons to desire and desiring at will

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude., This research has been supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union under grants FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), and also the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406 (Government of Catalonia).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Commitment to LOT

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis., Je soutiens qu’accepter les explications réalistes intentionnelles du comportement cognitif conduit inévitablement à endosser l’hypothèse du langage de la pensée («language of thought», LOT), et que cette position théorique est, par conséquent, largement répandue chez les philosophes de l’esprit. Au cours de la discussion, je propose un exposé succinct et précis de cette hypothèse et j’analyse une série d’exemples représentatifs de l’argumentation pro-LOT. Après avoir examiné deux cas de résistance à ce type de raisonnement, je conclus en montrant que le soutien accordé à la LOT est empiriquement substantiel, en dépit de la flexibilité et du caractère incomplet de cette hypothèse., This work has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, via the research projects FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The second person perspective

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule., This research has been generously supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research Projects FFI2016‐80588‐R and FFI2015‐63892‐P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), as well as the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Explaining public action

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and suggest that acknowledgement of this level highlights two important amendments of contemporary views. First, sceptics must accept that, when explanation is attitude-involving, the attitudes mentioned in the explanation of action must refer to the agent. Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, proponents of the de se should seek for accounts of de se attitudes that are not confined to a specific agent and are, therefore, sharable across agents., This work has received financial support from the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia) and the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research projects FFI2016-80588-R and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Commitment to LOT

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis., Je soutiens qu’accepter les explications réalistes intentionnelles du comportement cognitif conduit inévitablement à endosser l’hypothèse du langage de la pensée («language of thought», LOT), et que cette position théorique est, par conséquent, largement répandue chez les philosophes de l’esprit. Au cours de la discussion, je propose un exposé succinct et précis de cette hypothèse et j’analyse une série d’exemples représentatifs de l’argumentation pro-LOT. Après avoir examiné deux cas de résistance à ce type de raisonnement, je conclus en montrant que le soutien accordé à la LOT est empiriquement substantiel, en dépit de la flexibilité et du caractère incomplet de cette hypothèse., This work has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, via the research projects FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reasons to desire and desiring at will

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude., This research has been supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union under grants FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), and also the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406 (Government of Catalonia).