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LA FUNCION EXPLICATIVA DE LOS OBJETOS ABSTRACTOS: NATURALEZA Y COGNOSCIBILIDAD

FFI2013-41415-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2013
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 10
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
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Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought., This research has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research projects [FFI2013-41415-P] and [FFI2012-35153]) and the consolidated research group GRECC [SGR2014-406].
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reasons to desire and desiring at will

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude., This research has been supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union under grants FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), and also the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406 (Government of Catalonia).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Commitment to LOT

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis., Je soutiens qu’accepter les explications réalistes intentionnelles du comportement cognitif conduit inévitablement à endosser l’hypothèse du langage de la pensée («language of thought», LOT), et que cette position théorique est, par conséquent, largement répandue chez les philosophes de l’esprit. Au cours de la discussion, je propose un exposé succinct et précis de cette hypothèse et j’analyse une série d’exemples représentatifs de l’argumentation pro-LOT. Après avoir examiné deux cas de résistance à ce type de raisonnement, je conclus en montrant que le soutien accordé à la LOT est empiriquement substantiel, en dépit de la flexibilité et du caractère incomplet de cette hypothèse., This work has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, via the research projects FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Flogisto versus oxígeno: una nueva reconstrucción y su fundamentación histórica

  • Falguera López, José Luis
  • Donato Rodríguez, Xavier de
En este trabajo desarrollamos reconstrucciones estructuralistas de las teorías del flogisto, de Priestley, y del oxígeno, de Lavoisier. Nuestra propuesta es una alternativa a la de Caamaño (2009 y 2011) en una pretensión de ajustarnos más a las formulaciones de esas teorías tal y como se dieron históricamente
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Caricatures and Prop Oriented Make-Believe

  • Caldarola, Elisa
  • Plebani, Matteo
A caricature can reveal an aspect of its subject that a more faithful representation would fail to render: by depicting a slow and clumsy person as a monkey one can point out such qualities of the depicted subject, and by depicting a person with quite big ears as a person with enormous ears one can point out that the depicted person has rather big ears. How can a form of representation that is by definition inaccurate be so representationally powerful? Figurative language raises a similar puzzle. Metaphors, taken at face value, are usually false: men are not wolves. The same goes for hyperbolic talk: Putnam did not change his position one billion times in his career. Still, figurative language is expressively powerful: by saying that human beings are wolves or that Putnam changed his position one billion times in his career one conveys, in a very vivid way, some true information about the world (something concerning the facts that human beings are cruel and that Putnam frequently changed opinion). Kendall Walton (1993) provides an elegant explanation of the expressive utility of figurative language by linking metaphor and prop oriented make-believe. We explore the hypothesis that the theory of prop oriented make-believe can also explain the representational efficacy of caricatures.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

  • Sagüillo Fernández Vega, José Miguel
This paper focuses on Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. Putnam’s 1971 book Philosophy of Logic came one year later than Quine’s homonymous volume. In the first section, I compare these two Philosophies of Logic which exemplify realist-nominalist viewpoints in a most conspicuous way. The next section examines Putnam’s views on modality, moving from the modal qualification of his intuitive conception to his official generalized non-modal second-order set-theoretic concept of logical truth. In the third section, I emphasize how Putnam´s “mathematics as modal logic” departs from Quine’s “reluctant Platonism”. I also suggest a complementary view of Platonism and modalism showing them perhaps interchangeable but underlying different stages of research processes that make up a rich and dynamic mathematical practice. The final, more speculative section, argues for the pervasive platonistic conception enhancing the aims of inquiry in the practice of the working mathematician.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Putnam and contemporary fictionalism

  • Martínez Vidal, Concha
In his "Indispensability arguments in mathematics", Putnam rejects having argued in the terms of the argument known in the literature as "the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument". He considers that mathematics contribution to physics does not have to be interpreted in platonist terms but in his favorite modal variety (Putnam 1975; Putnam 2012). The purpose of this paper is to consider Putnam's acknowledged argument and philosophical position against contemporary so called in the literature 'fictionalist' views about applied mathematics. The conclusion will be that the account of the applicability of mathematics that stems from Putnam's acknowledged argument can be assimilated in many aspects to so-called 'fictionalist' views about applied mathematics.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought., This research has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research projects [FFI2013-41415-P] and [FFI2012-35153]) and the consolidated research group GRECC [SGR2014-406].
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Commitment to LOT

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis., Je soutiens qu’accepter les explications réalistes intentionnelles du comportement cognitif conduit inévitablement à endosser l’hypothèse du langage de la pensée («language of thought», LOT), et que cette position théorique est, par conséquent, largement répandue chez les philosophes de l’esprit. Au cours de la discussion, je propose un exposé succinct et précis de cette hypothèse et j’analyse une série d’exemples représentatifs de l’argumentation pro-LOT. Après avoir examiné deux cas de résistance à ce type de raisonnement, je conclus en montrant que le soutien accordé à la LOT est empiriquement substantiel, en dépit de la flexibilité et du caractère incomplet de cette hypothèse., This work has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, via the research projects FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reasons to desire and desiring at will

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude., This research has been supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union under grants FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), and also the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406 (Government of Catalonia).