Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación
Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics
This paper focuses on Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical
practice and ontology. Putnam’s 1971 book Philosophy of Logic came one year later than Quine’s homonymous
volume. In the first section, I compare these two Philosophies of Logic which exemplify realist-nominalist viewpoints in a most conspicuous way. The next section examines Putnam’s views on modality, moving from the
modal qualification of his intuitive conception to his official generalized non-modal second-order set-theoretic
concept of logical truth. In the third section, I emphasize how Putnam´s “mathematics as modal logic” departs
from Quine’s “reluctant Platonism”. I also suggest a complementary view of Platonism and modalism showing
them perhaps interchangeable but underlying different stages of research processes that make up a rich and dynamic mathematical practice. The final, more speculative section, argues for the pervasive platonistic conception enhancing the aims of inquiry in the practice of the working mathematician.