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ECONOMIA DEL BIENESTAR, TEORIA DE JUEGOS Y APLICACIONES

PID2019-107539GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2019
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DEL PAIS VASCO EUSKAL HERRIKO UNIBERTSITATEA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
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Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Distributional divergence as a unifying measurement framework

  • Lasso de la Vega, Casilda
  • Rodríguez Hernández, Juan Gabriel
  • Salas Del Mármol, Rafael
The measurement of various economic phenomena, including income inequality, poverty, richness, inequality-of-opportunity, horizontal equity, mobility, wage discrimination and goodness of fit, are examples of the measurement of the divergence between distributions. In all these examples there is a reference distribution and the aim is to examine to what extent any given distribution differs from the reference one. By providing an axiomatic characterization of a family of indices for measuring divergence between distributions, this paper provides a unifying framework for incorporating the measurement of many economic phenomena, while exploring the relationship of the derived family of indices to other existing measures.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Solidarity to achieve stability

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Gallo, Oihane
  • Iñarra, Elena
  • Moreno Ternero, Juan D.
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability., Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Oihane Gallo acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Government through grant PID2021-127119NBI00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by ‘‘ERDF A way of making Europe’’. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from Universidad Pública de Navarra through grant PJUPNA2023-11403. Oihane Gallo acknowledges the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through Project 100018_192583 as the main financial support. Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra aknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Government through grant PID2019-107539GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by ‘‘ERDF A way of making Europe’’. Elena Inarra acknowledges financial support from the Basque Government through grant IT1697-22. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Government through grant PID2020-115011GB-I00, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Gallo, Oihane
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project PID2021-127119NB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by "ERDF A way of making Europe"); Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through project 100018_192583, and additional support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects PID2021-127119NB-I00 and PID2019-107539GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”).