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CONCEPCIONES DEFLACIONARIAS EN ONTOLOGIA Y METAONTOLOGIA

PID2020-115482GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2020
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 7
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Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Inferentialism naturalized and anti-exceptionalism about logic

  • García Arnaldos, María Dolores
  • Martínez Vidal, Concha
Logical anti-exceptionalism, that is the idea that logic is not fundamentally different from other forms of inquiry such as science or mathematics, can be broadly characterized as being contrary to paradigmatic examples of exceptionalism about logic, such as the rationalist and semanticist conceptions. Logical inferentialism asserts that the meanings of logical expressions are determined by the basic rules prescribed for their correct application, such that comprehension of a logical expression is achieved through its use in accordance with the appropriate logical rule Brandom (Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, 1994); Boghossian (Blind Reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77(1), 225–248, 2003a), Boghossian (Epistemic Analyticity: A Defence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66(1), 15–35, 2003b). Despite the fact that inferentialism may appear to be an exceptionalist theory given its semanticist approach, not all inferentialists keep to the exceptionalist tenets of logic. This paper scrutinizes the recent moderate anti-exceptionalist proposal of naturalized inferentialism by Peregrin and Svoboda (Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic. Synthese 199 (3–4), 8781–8806, 2021). To contextualize Peregrin and Svoboda’s proposal, the paper presents a series of issues concerning the various anti-exceptionalist and exceptionalist theories; this discussion shows that naturalized inferentialism can resolve the adoption problem identified by Kripke, and Boghossian and Wright (Kripke, Quine, the “Adoption Problem” and the Empirical Conception of Logic. Mind, 133(529), 86–116, 2024) while remaining faithful to the anti-exceptionalism it seeks to advance, except for its adherence to the fundamental nature of logical human practice. Moreover, it illustrates that as anti-exceptionalist proposals reduce their aspirations, the distinction from exceptionalist positions progressively diminishes in clarity and precision.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A truthmaker-free approach to arithmetical truth, Una aproximación sin verificadores a la verdad aritmética

  • Valencia Equy, Pablo
Truthmaking is usually defined as a relationship of ontological dependence that holds between propositions (the truthbearers) and worldly objects (the truthmakers). But is this accurate? If we have reasons to answer this question in the negative, then we can either allow other kinds of objects as truthmakers or we can go further and state that truthmaking does not require a supposition that any particular kinds of objects are truthmakers, leading to a sort of ontological deflationism about truthmaking. These answers have already been raised in the literature as genuine possibilities. Still, none of them has been substantiated by anything more elementary and fundamental than truthmaking, which might render such responses ad hoc. In this paper, it will be shown that by relying on grounding, we can support both approaches. To demonstrate this, we will use arithmetical truth as the backbone of the paper, showing that we have independent reasons both to allow abstract objects to be truthmakers for arithmetical statements and to dispense altogether with the reliance on truthmakers to explain their truth
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

IAT/ML: a metamodel and modelling approach for discourse analysis

  • González Pérez, César
  • Pereira Fariña, Martín
  • Calderón Cerrato, Beatriz
  • Martín Rodilla, Patricia
Language technologies are gaining momentum as textual information saturates social networks and media outlets, compounded by the growing role of fake news and disinformation. In this context, approaches to represent and analyse public speeches, news releases, social media posts and other types of discourses are becoming crucial. Although there is a large body of literature on text-based machine learning, it tends to focus on lexical and syntactical issues rather than semantic or pragmatic. Being useful, these advances cannot tackle the nuanced and highly context-dependent problems of discourse evaluation that society demands. In this paper, we present IAT/ML, a metamodel and modelling approach to represent and analyse discourses. IAT/ML focuses on semantic and pragmatic issues, thus tackling a little researched area in language technologies. It does so by combining three different modelling approaches: ontological, which focuses on what the discourse is about; argumentation, which deals with how the text justifies what it says; and agency, which provides insights into the speakers’ beliefs, desires and intentions. Together, these three modelling approaches make IAT/ML a comprehensive solution to represent and analyse complex discourses towards their understanding, evaluation and fact checking.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A Collapse Result in the Mereology of Properties

  • Gracia Di Rienzo, Alejandro
I examine five principles about the metaphysics of properties, each of which has been defended in the literature: (1) the sum of properties is their corresponding conjunctive property, (2) the mereology of properties is classical, (3) properties are individuated by necessary co-instantiation, (4) sums of objects belonging to different categories do not belong to the category of any of their parts, and (5) there is at least a property necessarily instantiated by every individual. I prove that this package of views entails that there is exactly one property. Since this conclusion is highly implausible, I will discuss some ways of modifying the package in order to avoid it.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Naturalism: Deep Disagreement or Metalinguistic Negotiation?

  • García Arnaldos, María Dolores
  • Martínez Vidal, Concha
  • Ranalli, Chris
Drawing on the notions of deep disagreement and metalinguistic negotiation, we develop a new interpretation of the debate between scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism over the idea of naturalism. We argue that recent revisions of the debate suggest that the common perception of this as a case of metalinguistic negotiation is misleading. We trace this misperception back to the different ways in which scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism use the term ‘naturalism.’ Once this difference is considered, their seemingly contradictory claims on this issue can apparently be reconciled. It turns out to be a remarkably consequential metalinguistic negotiation over whether the term ‘naturalism’ should be reinterpreted or replaced for the purposes of positive philosophical theorizing. This interpretation explains the genuine disagreement that led scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism to engage in this debate and illuminates the broader meta-philosophical convictions that underlie each of their positions. Finally, we analyze how the development of the principle of charity acts as a mediating argumentative tool in disagreements.
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

IAT/ML: a metamodel and modelling approach for discourse analysis

  • González-Pérez, César
  • Pereira-Fariña, Martín
  • Calderón-Cerrato, Beatriz
  • Martín-Rodilla, Patricia
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature., [Abstract]: Language technologies are gaining momentum as textual information saturates social networks and media outlets, compounded by the growing role of fake news and disinformation. In this context, approaches to represent and analyse public speeches, news releases, social media posts and other types of discourses are becoming crucial. Although there is a large body of literature on text-based machine learning, it tends to focus on lexical and syntactical issues rather than semantic or pragmatic. Being useful, these advances cannot tackle the nuanced and highly context-dependent problems of discourse evaluation that society demands. In this paper, we present IAT/ML, a metamodel and modelling approach to represent and analyse discourses. IAT/ML focuses on semantic and pragmatic issues, thus tackling a little researched area in language technologies. It does so by combining three different modelling approaches: ontological, which focuses on what the discourse is about; argumentation, which deals with how the text justifies what it says; and agency, which provides insights into the speakers’ beliefs, desires and intentions. Together, these three modelling approaches make IAT/ML a comprehensive solution to represent and analyse complex discourses towards their understanding, evaluation and fact checking., The work presented in this paper has been partially funded by the AEI (Spanish National Research Agency) through grants PID2020-114758RB-I00, MCIN/AEI/https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 and PID2020-115482GB-I00, MCIN/AEI/https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

IAT/ML: a metamodel and modelling approach for discourse analysis

  • González-Pérez, César
  • Pereira-Fariña, Martín
  • Calderón-Cerrato, Beatriz
  • Martín-Rodilla, Patricia
Language technologies are gaining momentum as textual information saturates social networks and media outlets, compounded by the growing role of fake news and disinformation. In this context, approaches to represent and analyse public speeches, news releases, social media posts and other types of discourses are becoming crucial. Although there is a large body of literature on text-based machine learning, it tends to focus on lexical and syntactical issues rather than semantic or pragmatic. Being useful, these advances cannot tackle the nuanced and highly context-dependent problems of discourse evaluation that society demands. In this paper, we present IAT/ML, a metamodel and modelling approach to represent and analyse discourses. IAT/ML focuses on semantic and pragmatic issues, thus tackling a little researched area in language technologies. It does so by combining three different modelling approaches: ontological, which focuses on what the discourse is about; argumentation, which deals with how the text justifies what it says; and agency, which provides insights into the speakers’ beliefs, desires and intentions. Together, these three modelling approaches make IAT/ML a comprehensive solution to represent and analyse complex discourses towards their understanding, evaluation and fact checking., The work presented in this paper has been partially funded by the AEI (Spanish National Research Agency) through grants PID2020-114758RB-I00, MCIN/AEI/https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 and PID2020-115482GB-I00, MCIN/AEI/https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature., Peer reviewed