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DECISIONES COLECTIVAS Y MERCADOS CON INDIVISIBLES

PID2020-118022GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2020
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
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RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Folk theorem under bankruptcy

  • Beviá, Carmen
  • Corchón, Luis C.
  • Yasuda, Yosuke
  • Beviá, Carmen|||/items/1810a25e-8de8-4772-aa74-eb14b698f50d
In this paper, we examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE) within an infinite horizon oligopolistic market, accounting for the possibility of firm bankruptcy. Central to our dynamic analysis is the concept of Bankruptcy-Free (BF) allocations. The consideration of bankruptcy introduces several distinctive features not encompassed by standard models of infinitely repeated games. Notably, when firms are sufficiently patient towards future outcomes, achieving certain collusive outcomes as equilibria may not be possible. We discern qualitatively different results depending on the number of firms in the market; in a duopoly, only specific BF allocations can be sustained as SPE, while in scenarios with more than two firms, allocations outside the BF set can also be sustained as SPE. In both instances, it is crucial that the payoffs are above the minimax BF payoff, a condition more restrictive than the standard minimax payoff advocated in Folk Theorems.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Otros (Other)

Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked Preferences

  • Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
We consider strategy-proof social choice correspondences (SCCs) –mappings from preference profiles to sets of alternatives– when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives. We interpret the selected sets of alternatives as the basis for lotteries that determine the final social choice, and consider that agents’ preferences over sets are consistent with Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating from an initial probability assessment over the full set of alternatives. We exploit the relation between SCCs and probabilistic decision schemes –mappings from preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives–, to characterize the family of SCCs that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity for arbitrary initial probability assessments. We extend the analysis to multi-dimensional convex spaces of alternatives under the uniform initial probability assessment.