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COGNICION Y TOMA DE DECISIONES EN LOS MERCADOS

PID2019-108193GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2019
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Is it a fallacy to believe in the hot hand in the NBA three-point contest?

  • Miller, Joshua B.
  • Sanjurjo, Adam
  • Sanjurjo, Adam|||/items/ab59f950-b2be-4d6f-8436-40cbb3b15607
The NBA Three-Point Contest has been considered an ideal setting to study the hot hand, as it showcases the elite professional shooters that hot hand beliefs are typically directed towards, but in an environment that eliminates many of the confounds present in game action. We collect 34 years of NBA Three-Point Contest television broadcast data (1986–2020), apply a statistical approach that improves on those of previous studies, and find considerable evidence of hot hand shooting in and across individuals. Our results support fans’ and experts’ widely held belief in the hot hand among NBA shooters.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Choice, Deferral, And Consistency

  • Costa‐Gomes, Miguel A.
  • Cueva, Carlos
  • Gerasimou, Georgios
  • Tejiščák, Matúš
  • Cueva, Carlos|||/items/c6cc4748-e97c-4fa3-8ece-3d6bc0495905
We report on two novel choice experiments with real goods where subjects in one treatment are forced to choose, as is the norm in economic experiments, while in the other they are not but can instead incur a small cost to defer choice. Using a variety of measures, we find that the active choices (i.e., those that exclude the deferral outside option) of subjects in the nonforced‐choice treatment are generally more consistent. We also find that the combined deferral and active‐choice behavior of subjects in that treatment is explained better by a model of dominant choice with incomplete preferences than it is by rational choice. Our results suggest that nonforced‐choice experiments and models can be helpful in separating people's rational, hesitant/not‐yet‐rational and genuinely irrational behavior, and can potentially offer important new insights in revealed preference analysis.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

A Cold Shower for the Hot Hand Fallacy: Robust Evidence from Controlled Settings

  • Miller, Joshua B.
  • Sanjurjo, Adam
  • Sanjurjo, Adam|||/items/ab59f950-b2be-4d6f-8436-40cbb3b15607
The canonical hot hand fallacy result was recently reversed, based largely on a single statistic, and a data set that was underpowered for individual-level testing. Here we perform a more robust analysis, testing whether hot hand performance exists across (i) data sets: four different controlled shooting experiments, (ii) time: multiple sessions per individual spread across a six month gap, and (iii) various (improved) approaches to statistical testing. We find strong evidence of hot hand performance, both across data sets and within individuals across time. Moreover, in a study of beliefs, we find that expert observers can successfully predict which shooters get the hottest.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Delegation and mergers in two-sided markets

  • López-Cuñat, Javier M.
  • López-Cuñat, Javier M.|||/items/7cb66339-5e23-450f-99d6-8e5d21f5710b
This paper studies the influence of the initial number of platforms and the strength of indirect network effects on the profitability of exogenous horizontal mergers in two-sided Cournot markets with linear demands and costs. It compares the benchmark model, without delegation, with the model with strategic delegation where the owner of each platform hires the respective manager through an incentive scheme. It focuses on the existence and properties of the critical proportion, defined as the minimum proportion of firms, out of the total number, that must participate in a merger to be profitable. It is shown that, in both models, the critical proportion decreases with the strength of network effects. In the model without delegation, the critical proportion is increasing in the number of platforms if their number is greater than a threshold, which is decreasing in the strength of network effects. However, in the model with delegation, this occurs only when both the strength of network effects and the initial number of platforms are small enough. If not, the critical proportion may be decreasing.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Folk theorem under bankruptcy

  • Beviá, Carmen
  • Corchón, Luis C.
  • Yasuda, Yosuke
  • Beviá, Carmen|||/items/1810a25e-8de8-4772-aa74-eb14b698f50d
In this paper, we examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE) within an infinite horizon oligopolistic market, accounting for the possibility of firm bankruptcy. Central to our dynamic analysis is the concept of Bankruptcy-Free (BF) allocations. The consideration of bankruptcy introduces several distinctive features not encompassed by standard models of infinitely repeated games. Notably, when firms are sufficiently patient towards future outcomes, achieving certain collusive outcomes as equilibria may not be possible. We discern qualitatively different results depending on the number of firms in the market; in a duopoly, only specific BF allocations can be sustained as SPE, while in scenarios with more than two firms, allocations outside the BF set can also be sustained as SPE. In both instances, it is crucial that the payoffs are above the minimax BF payoff, a condition more restrictive than the standard minimax payoff advocated in Folk Theorems.