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ECONOMIA DEL COMPORTAMIENTO Y RETOS SOCIALES ACTUALES

PID2022-142356NB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2022
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 14
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Divisionalization in vertical structures

  • Bru, Lluís
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • Ordóñez-de-Haro, José-Manuel
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
We evaluate the incentives to create within-industry independent divisions once the vertical structure of the industry is considered. Divisionalization allows a firm to gain market share in the final market, but it also leads to an increase in total payments to the input supplier. The less competitive the upstream market, the more important the second effect will be, and this reduces the profitability of divisionalization. As a consequence, a less competitive upstream segment leads to a lower total number of divisions in equilibrium and a less competitive final market, harming end consumers who will face higher prices.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Mergers and Licensing With Horizontal Differentiation

  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • Poddar, Sougata
  • Sandonis, Joel
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
  • Sandonis, Joel|||/items/abdcff06-34ac-4e6e-b56e-cb7835de7642
We consider a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation and two firms producing differentiating goods in a Bertrand setting. The laboratory considers the possibility to license the innovation as an outsider patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry, becoming an incumbent patentee. Licensing takes place through observable two-part tariff contracts. We show that the merger is profitable only for small innovations and increases social welfare for both small and large innovations. Even though we allow the royalty to be higher than the size of the innovation, and opposite to the result in a Cournot setting, we find a region where the merger is both profitable and welfare improving. This occurs only for small innovations and sufficiently differentiated goods. The same result arises for consumer surplus which allows us to derive the optimal merger policy: compared with Cournot competition, a Bertrand setting calls for a more lenient merger policy.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Motivated beliefs about stock returns

  • Cueva, Carlos
  • Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Iñigo
  • Cueva, Carlos|||/items/c6cc4748-e97c-4fa3-8ece-3d6bc0495905
  • Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Iñigo|||/items/3fbd8c75-e6a0-4c16-9b1d-d72ce519cec8
Systematic biases in return expectations can distort stock prices and lead to inefficient capital allocation. In this paper, we report experimental evidence that buying a stock induces optimistically biased expectations when its price drops below the purchase price. We find this effect across two experimental settings, a controlled laboratory experiment and a six-week-long online experiment involving real equities traded in the stock market in real time. Our results are consistent with the idea that investors form “motivated beliefs” about stocks returns. In addition, motivated beliefs explain a substantial part of the reluctance to sell losing stocks, as in the well-known disposition effect.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Chain Restaurant Calorie Posting Laws, Obesity, and Consumer Welfare

  • Courtemanche, Charles
  • Frisvold, David
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Ouayogodé, Mariétou H.
  • Price, Michael K.
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
This paper investigates whether and why laws requiring chain restaurants to post calories on menus and menu boards work. We develop a model of calories consumed that highlights multiple potential channels through which these laws influence choice and that outlines an empirical strategy to disentangle these alternatives. We test the predictions of our model using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System on body mass index (BMI) and consumer well-being, as well as our own surveys on how the law influences where people eat and how randomized exposure to calorie information affects feelings towards menu items. Viewed in its totality, our results are consistent with an economic model in which calorie labels influence consumers both by providing salient information and by imposing a welfare-reducing moral cost (or feelings of guilt) on unhealthy eating.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

A Cold Shower for the Hot Hand Fallacy: Robust Evidence from Controlled Settings

  • Miller, Joshua B.
  • Sanjurjo, Adam
  • Sanjurjo, Adam|||/items/ab59f950-b2be-4d6f-8436-40cbb3b15607
The canonical hot hand fallacy result was recently reversed, based largely on a single statistic, and a data set that was underpowered for individual-level testing. Here we perform a more robust analysis, testing whether hot hand performance exists across (i) data sets: four different controlled shooting experiments, (ii) time: multiple sessions per individual spread across a six month gap, and (iii) various (improved) approaches to statistical testing. We find strong evidence of hot hand performance, both across data sets and within individuals across time. Moreover, in a study of beliefs, we find that expert observers can successfully predict which shooters get the hottest.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Source Theory: A Tractable and Positive Ambiguity Theory

  • Baillon, Aurélien
  • Bleichrodt, Han
  • Li, Chen
  • Wakker, Peter P.
  • Bleichrodt, Han|||/items/0ae99ae4-6cda-4783-9f47-5628af33661e
This paper introduces source theory, a new theory for decision under ambiguity (unknown probabilities). It shows how Savage’s subjective probabilities, with source-dependent nonlinear weighting functions, can model Ellsberg’s ambiguity. It can do so in Savage’s framework of state-contingent assets, permits nonexpected utility for risk, and avoids multistage complications. It is tractable, shows ambiguity attitudes through simple graphs, is empirically realistic, and can be used prescriptively. We provide a new tool to analyze weighting functions: pmatchers. They give Arrow–Pratt-like transformations but operate “within” rather than “outside” functions. We further show that ambiguity perception and inverse S probability weighting, seemingly unrelated concepts, are two sides of the same “insensitivity” coin.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Scoring rules in experimental procurement

  • Albano, Gian Luigi
  • Cipollone, Angela
  • Di Paolo, Roberto
  • Ponti, Giovanni
  • Sparro, Marco
  • Ponti, Giovanni|||/items/ef055331-2045-4ba3-9308-61994c6a83ab
We report the results of an experiment where subjects compete for procurement contracts to be awarded by means of a scoring auction. Two experimental conditions are considered, depending on the relative weight of quality vs price in the scoring rule. We show that different quality-price weights dramatically alter the strategic environment and affect efficiency. Our evidence shows that each weighting better delivers against a matching objective function than using a scoring rule which misrepresents the buyer's objective function. Nonetheless, there are large deviations in how each performs, with the higher weight on quality delivering much greater efficiency evaluated against its own objective function than a low weight on quality evaluated against its own objective function, despite the higher quality weight inducing higher deviations from equilibrium. We propose a “mediation analysis” to show that the “direct effect” (due to the different strategic properties of the induced game-forms) outweighs the “indirect” one (how the different game-forms affect out-of-equilibrium behaviour). We also perform a structural estimation of the Quantal Response Equilibrium induced by subjects’ behavior, where we find that subjects are risk averse and noisy play affects behavior in the direction of underbidding.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

An experiment on outcome uncertainty

  • Albarrán, Pedro
  • Alonso, Judit
  • Herrero, Carmen
  • Ponti, Giovanni
  • Sartarelli, Marcello
  • Topazio, Diletta
  • Albarrán, Pedro|||/items/88d87675-97c5-46ed-9afb-d7c2542c84a1
  • Ponti, Giovanni|||/items/ef055331-2045-4ba3-9308-61994c6a83ab
We report the evidence of a multi-stage lab experiment on individual decision making under ambiguity, where the latter is characterized by the (partial or) absence of information on some monetary values in the support of the lottery distributions. This complements the standard treatment of uncertainty where decision makers know the monetary prizes, but probabilities are uncertain. We use both a structural and a non-structural approach when analyzing subjects’ behavior under risk, compound risk, and outcome ambiguity. Our main finding is that subjects are risk-averse and ambiguity lovers in that they evaluate more optimistically uncertain payoffs under ambiguity compared to compound risk. We also study how subjects evaluate scenarios with uncertain outcomes: 60% of choices are consistent with the Expected Utility paradigm, while 40% of them are better described by a heuristic we label as “naïve,” in which the order of integration of Expected Utility is reversed (that is, they first form a point estimate of the uncertain payoffs, and then they evaluate the lotteries’ expected utility). Finally, we also find that risk and ambiguity aversion are positively correlated.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Tax motivated vertical FDI and transfer pricing

  • Sandonis, Joel
  • Yermukanova, Binur
  • Sandonis, Joel|||/items/abdcff06-34ac-4e6e-b56e-cb7835de7642
We examine a domestic downstream producer that acquires a foreign input supplier with the aim of manipulating the transfer price and shifting profits from a high-tax to a low-tax country. The multinational enterprise faces a trade-off: insourcing the input at a high transfer price reduces the corporate tax burden but at the cost of increasing the input cost of its downstream division, which reduces domestic sales and profits. The optimal transfer price balances this trade-off. Regulation under the arm’s length principle is shown to reduce the transfer price, which reduces distortion in the domestic production and expands the region in which vertical FDI benefits consumers and social welfare in the home country. We also show that promoting downstream competition could help align private and social incentives, reinforcing the positive effects of regulation.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Divisionalization and symmetric product differentiation

  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
I consider a standard two-stage game of divisionalization in which, in the first stage, two firms choose the number of divisions and, in the second stage, divisions compete independently à la Cournot. Two important assumptions are made. The creation of a division involves a fixed cost, and all divisions sell symmetrically differentiated goods. I obtain that differentiation stimulates the creation of divisions in equilibrium. This effect is so important that prices decrease with the level of product differentiation. As far as welfare is concerned, I obtain that the equilibrium number of divisions is lower than the one that it would maximize social welfare if no intervention at the market stage is feasible.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Sequential licensing with several competing technologies

  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • González Maestre, Miguel
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
We assume a multistage oligopoly wherein a given number of innovators compete by selling their substitutive technologies. Each innovator sequentially and independently chooses how many licenses to sell, and subsequently, all licensees compete à la Cournot in the product market. We show that, in equilibrium, the total number of licensees grows exponentially with the number of innovators. In addition, this sequential outcome is also obtained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of a game with endogenous timing. Interestingly, by extending the duopoly model of Badia et al. (Math Soc Sci 108:8–13, 2020) to the case of more than two innovators and exploring pure strategy equilibria instead of mixed strategy equilibria, we derive drastically different policy implications, in terms of patent regulations. Our results suggest that more competition in the upstream market (e.g., by relaxing patent protection against the appearance of similar technologies) tends to increase downstream competition and welfare instead of discouraging or delaying technology adoption. In addition, our analysis is extended to explore the strategic role of public investment in basic R &D.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Cooperative and competitive reasoning: From games to revolutions

  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
I introduce a novel solution concept, team level-k, in games of incomplete information. The model generalizes level-k and team reasoning models, and provides a unified explanation for several important phenomena in social dilemmas. In Rubinstein’s Email Game, players successfully coordinate upon receiving sufficient messages. In coordination games, the model explains several experimental facts that cannot be accounted for by global games, particularly the fact that there is greater coordination between people with public rather than private information, which has important policy implications. A generalization of the model relaxes the epistemic requirements for cooperative behavior, which I apply to study collective action and revolutions. Although the government attempts to manipulate citizen perceptions of the fundamentals, they might be able to coordinate if the fundamentals are sufficiently in their favor.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Takeovers and licensing in spatial competition

  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • Poddar, Sougata
  • Sandonis, Joel
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
  • Sandonis, Joel|||/items/abdcff06-34ac-4e6e-b56e-cb7835de7642
We consider a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation and considers the possibility to acquire either one or the two symmetric productive firms located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line. After the takeover decisions, technology transfer takes place inside the newly created firms and through licensing to the remaining independent firms. Each takeover decision is associated with established models of licensing and competition, with no takeover representing the case of an outsider patentee, one takeover representing an incumbent patentee, and two takeovers corresponding to full monopolization. Our analysis reveals that licensing by an incumbent patentee leads to full monopolization. Consequently, the optimal merger policy prescribes to forbid all takeovers if the antitrust authority aims to maximize consumer surplus. However, if licensing could be prohibited, the optimal structure involves one takeover without licensing. This market structure enables the transfer of technology while avoiding the anticompetitive and collusive effects of the licensing contracts.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Entry-Encouraging Vertical Integration

  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • Sandonis, Joel
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
  • Sandonis, Joel|||/items/abdcff06-34ac-4e6e-b56e-cb7835de7642
It is well established that a vertically integrated firm may have an incentive to raise its rivals' costs by increasing the wholesale price of inputs. We show that this incentive can lead vertical integration to facilitate entry into the downstream market: higher input costs weaken incumbent rivals, thereby improving the entrant's competitive position. Our framework considers an upstream firm that offers observable two-part tariff contracts to downstream firms. The downstream market consists of two incumbents and one potential entrant, with competition modeled à la Cournot. In addition, downstream firms may also source inputs from an alternative, less efficient supplier. We fully characterize the conditions under which entry-encouraging vertical integration is profitable and arises in equilibrium, and demonstrate that in most cases it enhances overall welfare. By contrast, we also identify a (small) region where vertical integration reduces the entrant's profits and deters entry. In such cases, vertical integration is always detrimental to welfare.