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COMPORTAMIENTO INDIVIDUAL Y DESIGUALDAD MACROECONOMICA

PID2022-138443NB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2022
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior

  • De Donder, Philippe
  • Llavador, Humberto
  • Penczynski, Stefan
  • Roemer, John E.
  • Vélez-Grajales, Roberto
The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions., Philippe De Donder acknowledges the French ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (EUR CHESS) for financial support. Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and the grants PID2023-153318NB-I00 and PID2022-138443NB-I00. John Roemer acknowledges the Institute for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for financial support.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior

  • De Donder, Philippe
  • Llavador, Humberto
  • Penczynski, Stefan
  • Roemer, John E.
  • Vélez-Grajales, Roberto
The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions., Philippe De Donder acknowledges the French ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (EUR CHESS) for financial support. Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and the grants PID2023-153318NB-I00 and PID2022-138443NB-I00. John Roemer acknowledges the Institute for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for financial support.