DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Low-Cost Full Correlated-Power-Noise Generator to Counteract Side-Channel Attacks
Considerable attention has been given to addressing side-channel attacks to improve the security of cryptographic hardware implementations. These attacks encourage the exploration of various countermeasures across different levels of abstraction, through masking and hiding techniques, mainly. In this paper, we introduce a novel hiding countermeasure designed to mitigate Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks without significant overhead. The new countermeasure interferes with the processed data, minimizing the power correlation with the secret key. The proposed method involves using a Correlated-Power-Noise Generator (CPNG). This study is supported by experimental results using CPA attacks on a SAKURA-G board with a SPARTAN-6 Xilinx FPGA. An Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher with 128/256-bit key size is employed for this purpose. The proposed secure design of AES has an area overhead of 29.04% compared to unprotected AES. After conducting a CPA attack, the acquisition of information about the private key has been reduced drastically by 44.5%., This research received no external funding., Authors want to thank projects Grant PID2020-116664RB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/ 10.13039/501100011033, project of “Programa Operativo FEDER 2014-2020 and Consejería de Economía, Conocimiento, Empresas y Universidad de la Junta de Andalucía under Project US-1380823”, the SPIRS (Secure Platform for ICT Systems Rooted at the Silicon Manfacturing Process) Project with Grant Agreement No. 952622 under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, and by the Ministry for Digital Transformation and Public Function through grant USECHIP (TSI-069100-2023-001) of PERTE Chip Chair program, funded by European Union–Next Generation EU., Peer reviewed