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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Oviedo, Jorge
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. We also exhibit examples in which, under this restricted domain of firms' preferences, the classical binary operations may not even be matching
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Maximal domain of preferences for the division problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.