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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Oviedo, Jorge
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms.