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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 7
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit

  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip|||0000-0001-7255-6954
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples' preferences are 'responsive,' i.e., when Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting as singles.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Weighted approval voting

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Vorsatz, Marc
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects the alternative for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. If the product is maximal for more than one alternative, a pre-specified tie-breaking rule is applied. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this family of voting procedures.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The incentive effects of affirmative action in a real-effort tournament

  • Calsamiglia, Caterina|||0000-0003-2079-7179
  • Franke, Jörg
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro|||0000-0002-1606-2631
Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Critics argue that they distort incentives, resulting in lower individual performance, and that the selected pool of tournament winners may be inefficient. In this paper, we study the empirical validity of such claims in a real-effort pair-wise tournament between children from two similar schools who systematically differ in how much training they received ex-ante in the task at hand. Our results show that performance was not reduced for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects and that it was in fact enhanced. Additionally, while affirmative action balanced the proportion of disadvantaged individuals winning their respective tournament, the average performance of the pool of winners only decreased slightly.