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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

El intercambio de riñones y la matemática discreta

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Se describe la adaptación de un algoritmo de matemática discreta, pro- puesto por David Gale en 1974, para resolver problemas abstractos de asignación de agentes a objetos indivisibles, con el fin de ordenar eficientemente los trasplantes cruzados de riñones de donantes vivos teniendo en cuenta las restricciones derivadas de las especificidades y complejidades que estos conllevan.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share.We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The division problem with voluntary participation

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents shares. We study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents voluntary participation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

  • Jaume, Daniel
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one maching model

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Oviedo, Jorge
The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which firms' preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q-separable. We also show that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference profiles if and only if the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of profiles
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo de revisión (ReviewArticle)

La moderna teoria de l'elecció social, de la impossibilitat a la possibilitat

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Es presenten els dos teoremes d'impossibilitat més importants de la moderna teoria de l'elecció social: el teorema d'Arrow per a funcions de benestar social no dictatorials que satisfan el principi de Pareto i la propietat de la independència d'alternatives irrellevants, i el teorema de Gibbard-Satterthwaite per a funcions d'elecció social no trivials i no manipulables. Es descriuen set exemples de problemes concrets d'elecció social en què l'estructura particular del conjunt d'alternatives socials permet restringir el domini de preferències individuals i dissenyar, per a cada un d'aquests, funcions d'elecció social no manipulables en els corresponents dominis de preferències restringits., We present the two most important impossibility theorems of the modern social choice theory: Arrow's theorem for social welfare functions satisfying the Pareto principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives property, and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem for non-trivial and strategy-proof social choice functions. We describe seven examples of specific social choice problems where the particular structure of the set of social alternatives allows to restrict the domain of individual preferences and to design for each of them strategy-proof social choice functions on the corresponding restricted preference domains