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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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El intercambio de riñones y la matemática discreta

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Se describe la adaptación de un algoritmo de matemática discreta, pro- puesto por David Gale en 1974, para resolver problemas abstractos de asignación de agentes a objetos indivisibles, con el fin de ordenar eficientemente los trasplantes cruzados de riñones de donantes vivos teniendo en cuenta las restricciones derivadas de las especificidades y complejidades que estos conllevan.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share.We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The division problem with voluntary participation

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents shares. We study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents voluntary participation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

  • Jaume, Daniel
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo de revisión (ReviewArticle)

La moderna teoria de l'elecció social, de la impossibilitat a la possibilitat

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Es presenten els dos teoremes d'impossibilitat més importants de la moderna teoria de l'elecció social: el teorema d'Arrow per a funcions de benestar social no dictatorials que satisfan el principi de Pareto i la propietat de la independència d'alternatives irrellevants, i el teorema de Gibbard-Satterthwaite per a funcions d'elecció social no trivials i no manipulables. Es descriuen set exemples de problemes concrets d'elecció social en què l'estructura particular del conjunt d'alternatives socials permet restringir el domini de preferències individuals i dissenyar, per a cada un d'aquests, funcions d'elecció social no manipulables en els corresponents dominis de preferències restringits., We present the two most important impossibility theorems of the modern social choice theory: Arrow's theorem for social welfare functions satisfying the Pareto principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives property, and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem for non-trivial and strategy-proof social choice functions. We describe seven examples of specific social choice problems where the particular structure of the set of social alternatives allows to restrict the domain of individual preferences and to design for each of them strategy-proof social choice functions on the corresponding restricted preference domains
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik's (1971) assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability, and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related to the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated with the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of matrices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
  • Sen, Arunava
  • Sharma, Tradib
  • Ülkü, Levent
We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common prior, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Division Problem under Constraints

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems, The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference profile, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference profile if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like efficiency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.