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REGLAS DE REPARTO EN DIVERSOS PROBLEMAS ECONOMICOS

ECO2011-23460

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Funding agency acronym MICINN
Program Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprogram Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Call Proyectos I+D
Call year 2011
State Plan 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Management unit Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The results prove that the main difference between these two coalitional values is that the former is efficient, while the latter verifies a property of 2-efficiency.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf-Owen coalitional value.
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Values and coalition configurations

  • Albizuri, M. Josune
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
In this paper we consider coalition configurations (Albizuri et al. in Games Econ Behav 57:1–17, 2006), that is, families of coalitions not necessarily disjoint whose union is the grand coalition, and give a generalization of the Shapley value (Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953) and the Owen value (Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88, 1977) when coalition configurations form. This will be an alternative definition to the one given by Albizuri et al., Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2011-23460, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2012-33618, Universidad del País Vasco | Ref. UFI11/5, Universidad del País Vasco | Ref. GIU13/31, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 10PXIB362299PR
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bargaining and membership

  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium., Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2011-23460, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 10PXIB362299PR
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

  • Gómez Rúa, María
n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem., Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2008-03484-C02-01, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2011-23460
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Division Problem under Constraints

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems, The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference profile, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference profile if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like efficiency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Molis Bañales, Elena
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions., Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the project ECO2012–34202 and Fundación Ramón Areces. María Gómez-Rúa acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the project ECO2011-23460 and the Galician Government through the project 2013XGCEDU08072013EMER. Elena Molis acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the projects ECO2012–31346 and ECO2013–44879–R, from the Consejería de Economía, Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo, Junta de Andalucía through the projects SEJ–492 and SEJ–1436 and from the Basque Government through the project IT568–13.