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OPTIMIZACION Y REPARTO EN PROBLEMAS DE DECISION MULTI-AGENTE CON APLICACIONES EN EXTINCION DE INCENDIOS

MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2014
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The results prove that the main difference between these two coalitional values is that the former is efficient, while the latter verifies a property of 2-efficiency.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Assignment problems in wildfire suppression: a case study on control of flight resources

  • Rodríguez Veiga, Jorge
  • Gómez Costa, Iván
  • Ginzo Villamayor, María José
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
The phenomenon of wildfires has become one of the biggest problems our forests are suffering due to the high frequency and intensity that has acquired in recent decades. As the budget and fire resources are limited, it is essential to control these catastrophic fires by making efficient decisions. In this paper, we make use of operations research techniques that allow the optimal assignments of aircrafts to extinguishing wheels and to refueling points, which are two important tasks to be performed by the controller of aerial resources in a forest fire.
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On coalition formation in a non-convex multi-agent inventory problem

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2616-y., [Abstract]: A multi-agent inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual inventory problems and can coordinate their orders to reduce costs. This paper analyses a multi-agent inventory problem in which each agent faces a continuous-review inventory problem, with a deterministic linear demand, no holding costs and a limited capacity warehouse. In the case under study, shortages are allowed as follows. Goods are bought from an external supplier and then they are stored in each agent’s warehouse. These stored goods usually satisfy demand. However, each agent may alternative produce their own goods, which are less costly but of lower quality. When a shortage of the purchased goods occurs, demand is satisfied with the produced goods until a new order arrives. The problem under study herein arises in a farming community, and is a variation of a problem addressed by Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2015). However, the existence of two acquisition costs makes it substantially different from Fiestras-Janeiro et al.’s problem and significantly complicates its analysis since the resulting cost functions may now be non-convex. This paper establishes the optimal inventory policies for our problem and obtains a stable order structure when agents allocate the joint costs using a proportional rule. In addition, it illustrates the performance of our model and results in an example., Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2011-27731-C03-01, MTM2011-27731-C03-03, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P and MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Estimation of the Owen Value Based on Sampling

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the paper has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73848-2_33., [Abstract]: In this paper we introduce a procedure based on sampling to estimate the Owen value of a cooperative game. It is an adaptation of an analogous procedure for the estimation of the Shapley value, and it is specially useful when dealing with games having large sets of players. We provide some results in order to choose a sample size guaranteeing a bound for the absolute error with a given probability, and illustrate our procedure with an example taken from the game theoretical literature., This work has been supported by MINECO grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16, [Abstract]: In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs., Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01), Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Values, nullifiers and dummifiers

  • Alonso-Meijide, José Mª
  • Costa, Julián
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
This is an Accepted Manuscript version of the following paper: Alonso-Meijide, J. M., Costa, J., & García-Jurado, I. (2019). ‘Values, nullifiers and dummifiers’ , accepted for publication in Handbook of the Shapley value (pp. 75-92). Chapman and Hall/CRC. ISBN: 978-0-8153-7468-8. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351241410 ., [Abstract]: In this chapter, we provide new axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values using properties concerning nullifying and dummifying players. Then, we introduce a novel value for TU-games using an axiomatic approach: the e-Banzhaf value. Specifically, we take the properties of efficiency, symmetry, additivity, and combine them with the property for nullifying players that we consider most natural: the nullifying players pay for the mean property. We prove that these four properties characterize the e-Banzhaf value. This novel value possesses some properties of the Shapley value and some of the Banzhaf value, and can be seen as a kind of efficient variation of the Banzhaf value. However, it is not invariant to S-equivalence and it does not satisfy the dummifying players pay for the mean property. Finally, we introduce an alternative novel value for TU-games: the ie-Banzhaf value. It is the unique value for TU-games that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, additivity and the dummifying players pay for the mean property. We prove that the ie-Banzhaf value is also a kind of efficient variation of the Banzhaf value and that it is invariant to S-equivalence., This work has been supported by MINECO grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P and MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C 2017/38, and Centro Singular deInvestigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C 2017/38, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01