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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cognitive resource allocation determines the organization of personal networks

  • Tamarit, Ignacio
  • Cuesta, José A.
  • Dunbar, Robin I. M.
  • Sánchez, Angel
The typical human personal social network contains about 150 relationships including kin, friends, and acquaintances, organized into a set of hierarchically inclusive layers of increasing size but decreasing emotional intensity. Data from a number of different sources reveal that these inclusive layers exhibit a constant scaling ratio of 3. While the overall size of the networks has been connected to our cognitive capacity, no mechanism explaining why the networks present a layered structure with a consistent scaling has been proposed. Here we show that the existence of a heterogeneous cost to relationships (in terms of time or cognitive investment), together with a limitation in the total capacity an individual has to invest in them, can naturally explain the existence of layers and, when the cost function is linear, explain the scaling between them. We develop a one-parameter Bayesian model that fits the empirical data remarkably well. In addition, the model predicts the existence of a contrasting regime in the case of small communities, such that the layers have an inverted structure (increasing size with increasing emotional intensity). We test the model with five communities and provide clear evidence of the existence of the two predicted regimes. Our model explains, based on first principles, the emergence of structure in the organization of personal networks and allows us to predict a rare phenomenon whose existence we confirm empirically., I.T., J.A.C., and A.S. were supported in part by Fundación Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria through Grant Los Números de Dunbar y la Estructura de las Sociedades Digitales: Modelización y Simulación; by Ministerio de Economía, Innovación y Competitividad (Spain) through Grants FIS2015-64349-P VARIANCE (Ministerio de Economía y Empresa/Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, Unión Europea); and by the European Commission through FET Open Research and Innovation Action 662725 Bridging the Gap: From Individual Behaviour to the Socio-Technical Man and FET Proactive RIA 640772 Distributed Global Financial Systems for Society. R.I.M.D. was supported by the European Research Council Advanced Investigator through Grant 295663.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Intergenerational cooperation within the household: a public good game with three generations

  • Molina, Jose Alberto
  • Ferrer, Alfredo
  • Gimenez Nadal, Jose Ignacio
  • Garcia Lazaro, Carlos
  • Moreno, Yamir
  • Sánchez, Angel
We analyze cooperation of individuals in a family context, using a Public Good game. In a lab experiment, 165 individuals from 55 three-generation families (youth, parent, and grandparent) play a repeated Public Good game in three different treatments: one in which three members of the same family play each other (family), a second with the youth and two non-family members, while preserving the previous generational structure (inter-generational), and a third in which three randomly-selected players play each other (random). We find that all the age groups cooperate more when playing with relatives, indicating that family ties may have a positive relationship to contributions to the Public Good. We also find that this trend is more evident for the youths and the parents than for the grandparents. Furthermore, young individuals tend to cooperate less than older generations, especially in non-family treatments. Our results serve as evidence of the relationship between family ties and inter-generational cooperative behaviors., We are grateful to the IBERCIVIS Foundation for organizing volunteer recruitment. This paper has benefited from funding by the Spanish Ministry of Economics (Project ECO2012-34828), the EU FET Proactive Project Dolfins (Grant 640772) and FET Open Project IBSEN (Grant 662725). This paper was partially designed while Jose Alberto Molina was Visiting Fellow at the Department of Economics of Boston College (US), to which he would like to express his thanks for the hospitality and facilities provided.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games

  • Pereda, María
  • Capraro, Valerio
  • Sánchez, Angel
An Author correction to this article was published: Scientific Reports, 9, 12869, Sept. 2019, Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger groups, while others that cooperation is easier in larger groups, and yet others that cooperation attains its maximum in intermediate size groups. Here we add to this field of work by reporting a two-treatment empirical study where subjects play a Public Goods Game with a Critical Mass, such that the return for full cooperation increases linearly for early contributions and then stabilizes after a critical mass is reached (the two treatments differ only on the critical mass). We choose this game for two reasons: it has been argued that it approximates real-life social dilemmas; previous work suggests that, in this case, group size might have an inverted-U effect on cooperation, where the pick of cooperation is reached around the critical mass. Our main innovation with respect to previous experiments is that we implement a within-subject design, such that the same subject plays in groups of different size (from 5 to 40 subjects). Groups are formed at random at every round and there is no feedback. This allows us to explore if and how subjects change their choice as a function of the size of the group. We report three main results, which partially contrast what has been suggested by previous work: in our setting (i) the critical mass has no effect on cooperation; (ii) group size has a positive effect on cooperation; (iii) the most chosen option (played by about 50% of the subjects) is All Defection, followed by All Cooperation (about 10% of the subjects), whereas the rest have a slight trend to switch preferentially from defection to cooperation as the group size increases., This work was partially supported by MINECO/FEDER (Spain) through grant FIS2015-64349-P VARIANCE (AS) and by the EU through FET Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, AS).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences

  • Hernández, Penélope
  • Martínez Cánovas, Guillem
  • Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel
  • Sánchez, Angel
In this work we characterize equilibrium introduced in configurations for networks with conflicting preferences. We use the model Hernandez et al. (2013) to study the effect of three main factors: the strength of individual preferences, the level of integration in the network, and the intensity of conflict in the population. Our aim is to understand how likely is it that social outcomes are either those in which preferences dominate choices or those in which some individuals sacrifice their preferences to achieve consensus with others. Our results show that, the stronger individual preferences, the harder to achieve consensus in choices. However, in cases where the payoff ratio is less extreme, full coordination (consensus) is always an equilibrium. Finally, if the level of conflict is low, individual preferences become less relevant and all players choosing what they prefer is not an equilibrium anymore. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V., This work was supported by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, MEC Spain (ECO2013-46550-R), the Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/054) and the European Commission H2020FETOpenRIA662725.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

  • Antonioni, Alberto
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Tomassini, Marco
In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction., A. A. gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (under grants no. 200020-143224, CR13I1-138032 and P2LAP1-161864) and by the Rectors’ Conference of the Swiss Universities (under grant no. 26058983). All authors acknowledge financial support to carry out the experiments by the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne and the fundamental support by Prof. Rafael Lalive. This work has been supported in part by the European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 (IBSEN) and by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under grant FIS2015-64349-P (VARIANCE).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The emergence of altruism as a social norm

  • Pereda, María
  • Branas Garza, Pablo
  • Rodríguez Lara, Ismael
  • Sánchez, Angel
Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior from others even if they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectations after playing a DG by reinforcement learning to construct a model that explains the main experimental results in the DG. Full agreement with the experimental results is reached when some degree of mismatch between expectations and donations is added into the model. These results are robust against the presence of envious agents, but affected if we introduce selfish agents that do not update their expectations. Our results point to social norms being on the basis of the generous behavior observed in the DG and also to the wide applicability of reinforcement learning to explain many strategic interactions., We are thankful to the two anonymous reviewers of this paper for their help in improving the manuscript. This work was partially supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, A.S.) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, A.S.), grants ECO2013-44879-R and ECO2016-75575-R from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grant FIS2015-64349-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and grant P12.SEJ.01436 from Junta de Andalucía (Spain).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation

  • Pereda, María
  • Vilone, Daniele
In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) among themselves and the pay-off matrix of an individual changes according to the number of neighbors that are "vigilant", i.e., how many neighbors watch out for her behavior. In particular, the temptation to defect decreases linearly with the number of vigilant neighbors. This model proved to support cooperation in specific conditions, and here we check its robustness with different topologies, microscopical update rules and initial conditions. By means of many numerical simulations and few theoretical considerations, we find in which situations the vigilance by the others is more effective in favoring cooperative behaviors and when its influence is weaker., M.P. acknowledges support from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725 and the Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIS) for providing access to the Altamira supercomputer. D.V. acknowledges support from H2020 FETPROACT-GSS CIMPLEX Grant No. 641191, which funded the publication of this article and the CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) for the Short Term Mobility Program 2016, which funded his stay at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid where this work was accomplished.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emergence and Evolution of Cooperation Under Resource Pressure

  • Pereda García, María
  • Zurro, Debora
  • Santos, Jose I.
  • Briz I Godino, Ivan
  • Álvarez, Myriam
  • Caro, Jorge
  • Galán, José M.
We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies., The authors acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project CSD2010-00034 (SimulPast CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and HAR2009-06996; from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; and from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725. We also acknowledge assistance from the Santander Supercomputación support group at the University of Cantabria, which provided access to the Altamira Supercomputer at the Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIC), a member of the Spanish Supercomputing Network, for performing simulations/analyses.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Physics of human cooperation: experimental evidence and theoretical models

  • Sánchez, Angel
In recent years, many physicists have used evolutionary game theory combined with a complex systems perspective in an attempt to understand social phenomena and challenges. Prominent among such phenomena is the issue of the emergence and sustainability of cooperation in a networked world of selfish or self-focused individuals. The vast majority of research done by physicists on these questions is theoretical, and is almost always posed in terms of agent-based models. Unfortunately, more often than not such models ignore a number of facts that are well established experimentally, and are thus rendered irrelevant to actual social applications. I here summarize some of the facts that any realistic model should incorporate and take into account, discuss important aspects underlying the relation between theory and experiments, and discuss future directions for research based on the available experimental knowledge., This work was partially supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725), and by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain)/FEDER (EU) grant VARIANCE (contract no. FIS2015-64349-P). Project IBSEN is in fact about large-scale experiments and provides a open-access platform for researchers to carry out them.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emergence and Evolution of Cooperation Under Resource Pressure

  • Pereda, María
  • Zurro, Debora
  • Santos Martín, José Ignacio
  • Briz I Godino, Ivan
  • Alvarez, Myriam
  • Caro, Jorge
  • Galan, Jose M.
We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies., The authors acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project CSD2010-00034 (SimulPast CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and HAR2009-06996; from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; and from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725. We also acknowledge assistance from the Santander Supercomputación support group at the University of Cantabria, which provided access to the Altamira Supercomputer at the Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIC), a member of the Spanish Supercomputing Network, for performing simulations/analyses.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation

  • Vicens, Julian
  • Bueno-Guerra, Nereida
  • Gutiérrez-Roig, Mario
  • Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
  • Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesus
  • Perelló, Josep
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Moreno, Yamir
  • Duch, Jordi
Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understanding of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a common goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contributing significantly more to the public goods than the richer −sometimes twice as much. An unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behavior, finding the poorest participants within two "generous clusters" and the richest into a "greedy cluster". Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fairness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences., This work was supported by Generalitat de Catalunya (ES) 2013 DI 49 to Dr. Julian Vicens and Dr. Jordi Duch, Generalitat de Catalunya (ES) 2014 SGR 608 to Dr. Mario Guitérrez-Roig and Dr. Josep Perelló, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2013-47532-C3-2-P to Dr. Mario Guitérrez-Roig and Dr. Josep Perelló, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2016-78904-C3-2-P to Dr. Julian Vicens and Dr. Josep Perelló, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2013-47532-C3-1-P to Dr. Jordi Duch, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2016-78904-C3-1-P to Dr. Jordi Duch, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2015-71582-C2 to Dr. Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2014-55867-P to Dr. Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes and Dr. Yamir Moreno, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2015-64349-P to Dr. Angel Sánchez, Horizon 2020 640772 to Dr. Julian Vicens, Dr. Carlos Grácia-Lázaro, and Dr. Yamir Moreno, Horizon 2020 662725 to Dr. Angel Sánchez and Dr. Yamir Moreno.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks

  • Pereda, María
In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure., The author acknowledge support from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725 and from Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIC) for providing access to the Altamira supercomputer.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equal status in ultimatum games promotes rational sharing

  • Han, Xiao
  • Cao, Shian
  • Bao, Jian-Zhang
  • Wang, Wen-Xu
  • Zhang, Boyu
  • Gao, Zi-You
  • Sánchez, Angel
Experiments on the Ultimatum Game (UG) repeatedly show that people's behaviour is far from rational. In UG experiments, a subject proposes how to divide a pot and the other can accept or reject the proposal, in which case both lose everything. While rational people would offer and accept the minimum possible amount, in experiments low offers are often rejected and offers are typically larger than the minimum, and even fair. Several theoretical works have proposed that these results may arise evolutionarily when subjects act in both roles and there is a fixed interaction structure in the population specifying who plays with whom. We report the first experiments on structured UG with subjects playing simultaneously both roles. We observe that acceptance levels of responders approach rationality and proposers accommodate their offers to their environment. More precisely, subjects keep low acceptance levels all the time, but as proposers they follow a best-response-like approach to choose their offers. We thus find that status equality promotes rational sharing while the influence of structure leads to fairer offers compared to well-mixed populations. Our results are far from what is observed in single-role UG experiments and largely different from available predictions based on evolutionary game theory., We thank Long Ma, Xiao-Yan Sun, Zhao-Long Hu for assistance with carrying out the experiments and Xin-Di Wang, Ke-Qiang Li for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71771026, BZ; Grant No. 71401037, CS; Grant No. 71631002, WW, BZ), by EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, AS) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, AS), and by grant FIS2015-64349-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE, AS).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emotions and strategic behaviour: The case of the Ultimatum Game

  • Tamarit, Ignacio
  • Sánchez, Angel
Human behaviour in economic interactions has attracted an increasing amount of attention over the last decades. The economic assumption that people would behave focusing on their own material self-interest was proved incomplete, once the empirical evidence consistently showed that many other motives may influence such behaviour. Therefore, models that can incorporate rational decision process as well as other intervening factors are a key issue to both understand the observations from economic experiments and to apply the lessons learned from them. In this paper, we incorporate the influence of emotions to the utility function in an explicit manner, using the Ultimatum Game as a case study. Our model is amenable to analytical study, and is connected with the Circumplex model of emotions and with Kahneman's two-system theory. The simplicity of the model allows to obtain predictions for the offers and acceptance thresholds. We study two specific examples, when the model parameters are distributed uniformly or normally, and show that in the latter case the results are already qualitatively correct. Although this work can be considered as a first approach, it includes what we believe are the main stylized facts, is able to qualitatively reproduce experimental results in a very simple manner, and can be straightforwardly extended to other games., This work was supported by Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad, grant VARIANCE (http://www.mineco.gob.es/portal/site/mineco?lang_choosen=en) (author receiving the funding: AS); European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 IBSEN (http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/fet-open) (author receiving the funding: AS); and European Commission through (FET Proactive Global Systems Science), RIA 640772 Distributed Global Financial Systems for Society (DOLFINS) (https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/news/first-future-and-emerging-technologies-fet-proactive-projects-under-horizon-2020-framework). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Improving transportation networks: effects of population structure and decision making policies

  • Marti, Federico Pablo
  • Sánchez, Angel
Transportation networks are one of the fundamental tools for human society to work, more so in our globalized world. The importance of a correct, efficient design of a transportation network for a given region or country cannot be overstated. We here study how network design is affected by the geography of the towns or nuclei to be connected, and also by the decision process necessary to choose which connections should be improved (in a generic sense) first. We begin by establishing that Delaunay networks provide an efficient starting point for the network design and at the same time allow us to introduce a computationally amenable model. Subsequent improvements lead to decentralized designs in geographies where towns are more or less homogeneously distributed, whereas radial designs arise when there is a core-periphery distribution of nodes. We also show that optimization of Delaunay networks outperforms that of complete networks at a lower cost, by allowing for a proper selection of the links to improve. In closing, we draw conclusions relevant to policy making applied to designing transportation networks and point our how our study can be useful to identify mechanisms relevant to the historical development of a region., This work has been supported in part by Ministerio de Economía, Innovación y Competitividad (Spain) through grants FIS2015-64349-P VARIANCE (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and CSO2016-74888-C4-4-R CITITALENT (AEI/FEDER, UE) and by the European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 IBSEN and FET Proactive RIA 640772 DOLFINS.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Humans expect generosity

  • Branas Garza, Pablo
  • Rodriguez Lara, Ismael
  • Sánchez, Angel
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological feature likely to be relevant is the formation of expectations, particularly about receiving cooperative or generous behavior from others. Without such expectations, social life will be seriously impeded and, in turn, expectations leading to satisfactory interactions can become norms and institutionalize cooperation. In this paper, we assess people's expectations of generosity in a series of controlled experiments using the dictator game. Despite differences in respective roles, involvement in the game, degree of social distance or variation of stakes, the results are conclusive: subjects seldom predict that dictators will behave selfishly (by choosing the Nash equilibrium action, namely giving nothing). The majority of subjects expect that dictators will choose the equal split. This implies that generous behavior is not only observed in the lab, but also expected by subjects. In addition, expectations are accurate, matching closely the donations observed and showing that as a society we have a good grasp of how we interact. Finally, correlation between expectations and actual behavior suggests that expectations can be an important ingredient of generous or cooperative behavior., This project has been circulating over the last years under different titles. We greatly appreciate the comments and suggestions of James Andreoni, Jeffrey Butler, Antonio Cabrales, Valerio Capraro, Gary Charness, Maripaz Espinosa, John List, Luis Miller, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, David Rand, Jean-Robert Tyran, as well as insights from participants at the French Economic Association Meeting (Lyon), SIG Max Planck Institute (Jena), the SEET Meeting, and Alhambra Meets Colosseo Meeting (Rome). We are also thankful to attendees of seminars in Bar-Ilan University, fae2-Bilbao, Middlesex University London and University of Exeter. Luis Lopez-Lemus provided excellent assistance during the experimental sessions run in Mexico, and Mark Houssart was very useful in proofreading the manuscript. This work was partially supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, A.S.) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, A.S.), grant ECO2013-44879-R from the Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Spain), grant FIS2015-64349-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and grant P12.SEJ.01436 from Junta de Andalucía (Spain).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation

  • Vincens, Julian
  • Bueno Guerra, Nereida
  • Gutierrez Roig, Mario
  • Gracia Lázaro, Carlos
  • Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesus
  • Perello, Josep
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Moreno, Yamir
  • Duch, Jordi
Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understanding of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a common goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contributing significantly more to the public goods than the richer -sometimes twice as much. An unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behavior, finding the poorest participants within two "generous clusters" and the richest into a "greedy cluster". Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fairness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences., This work was supported by Generalitat de Catalunya (ES) 2013 DI 49 to Dr. Julian Vicens and Dr. Jordi Duch, Generalitat de Catalunya (ES) 2014 SGR 608 to Dr. Mario Guitérrez-Roig and Dr. Josep Perelló, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2013-47532-C3-2-P to Dr. Mario Guitérrez-Roig and Dr. Josep Perelló, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2016-78904-C3-2-P to Dr. Julian Vicens and Dr. Josep Perelló, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2013-47532-C3-1-P to Dr. Jordi Duch, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2016-78904-C3-1-P to Dr. Jordi Duch, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2015-71582-C2 to Dr. Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2014-55867-P to Dr. Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes and Dr. Yamir Moreno, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ES) FIS2015-64349-P to Dr. Angel Sánchez, Horizon 2020 640772 to Dr. Julian Vicens, Dr. Carlos Grácia-Lázaro, and Dr. Yamir Moreno, Horizon 2020 662725 to Dr. Angel Sánchez and Dr. Yamir Moreno. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment

  • Lozano, Pablo
  • Antonioni, Alberto
  • Tomassini, Marco
  • Sánchez, Angel
Reputation plays a key role among the mechanisms supporting cooperation in our society. This is a well-known observation and, in fact, several studies have shown that reputation may substantially increase cooperation among subjects playing Prisoner's Dilemma games in the laboratory. Unfortunately, recent experiments indicate that when reputation can be faked cooperation can still be maintained at the expense of honest subjects who are deceived by the dishonest ones. As experimental work is limited due to financial and other reasons, we present here an agent-based simulation model inspired by, and calibrated against, the results obtained in the experiment. We thus simulate much larger population sizes over longer times, and test other model parameters to see whether the observed behavior generalizes in those yet untried conditions. The results show that the collective behavior is qualitatively similar in larger systems and stable over longer times horizons. We conclude that the findings of the experimental work are meaningful, taking into account that the model is strictly tailored to our particular experimental setting and therefore it is a possible explanation of our observations whose applicability to other contexts requires further research. We argue that simulations like the ones presented here may also be useful to cheaply and quickly suggest settings and options to enhance and facilitate further experiments, which, in turn, may provide new tests of the models themselves., This work was partially supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, AS) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, A. S.), and by the Ministerio de Econom a y Competitividad of Spain (grant no. FIS2015-64349-P, A.S.) (MINECO/FEDER, UE). A.A. gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation under Grants No. P2LAP1-161864 and P300P1-171537.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Quantitative account of social interactions in a mental health care ecosystem: cooperation, trust and collective action

  • Cigarini, Anna
  • Vicens, Julián
  • Duch, Jordi
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Perelló, Josep
Mental disorders have an enormous impact in our society, both in personal terms and in the economic costs associated with their treatment. In order to scale up services and bring down costs, administrations are starting to promote social interactions as key to care provision. We analyze quantitatively the importance of communities for effective mental health care, considering all community members involved. By means of citizen science practices, we have designed a suite of games that allow to probe into different behavioral traits of the role groups of the ecosystem. The evidence reinforces the idea of community social capital, with caregivers and professionals playing a leading role. Yet, the cost of collective action is mainly supported by individuals with a mental condition - which unveils their vulnerability. The results are in general agreement with previous findings but, since we broaden the perspective of previous studies, we are also able to find marked differences in the social behavior of certain groups of mental disorders. We finally point to the conditions under which cooperation among members of the ecosystem is better sustained, suggesting how virtuous cycles of inclusion and participation can be promoted in a 'care in the community' framework., This work was partially supported by Federació de Salut Mental Catalunya; by MINEICO (Spain), Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) through grants FIS2013-47532-C3-1-P (JD), FIS2016-78904-C3-1-P (JD), FIS2013-47532-C3-2-P (JP), FIS2016-78904-C3-2-P (JP, AC); by Generalitat de Catalunya (Spain) through Complexity Lab Barcelona (contract no. 2014 SGR 608, JP) and through Secretaria d’Universitats i Recerca (contract no. 2013 DI 49, JD, JV); and by the EU through FET Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, AS) and FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, AS).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games

  • Antonioni, Alberto
  • Pereda García, María
  • Cronin, K. A.
  • Tomassini, M.
  • Sánchez, Angel
The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation., A.A. gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation under Grants No. P2LAP1-161864 and P300P1-171537. This work was also supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, A.S.) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, A.S.), and by the Ministerio de Econom a y Competitividad of Spain (grant no. FIS2015-64349-P, A.S.) (MINECO/FEDER, UE).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences

  • Mazzoli, M.
  • Sánchez, Angel
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has addressed this issue by combining the physics of complex networks with a description of interactions in terms of evolutionary game theory. We here take this research a step further by introducing a most salient societal factor such as the individuals' preferences, a characteristic that is key to understanding much of the social phenomenology these days. We consider a heterogeneous, agent-based model in which agents interact strategically with their neighbors, but their preferences and payoffs for the possible actions differ. We study how such a heterogeneous network behaves under evolutionary dynamics and different strategic interactions, namely coordination games and best shot games. With this model we study the emergence of the equilibria predicted analytically in random graphs under best response dynamics, and we extend this test to unexplored contexts like proportional imitation and scale free networks. We show that some theoretically predicted equilibria do not arise in simulations with incomplete information, and we demonstrate the importance of the graph topology and the payoff function parameters for some games. Finally, we discuss our results with the available experimental evidence on coordination games, showing that our model agrees better with the experiment than standard economic theories, and draw hints as to how to maximize social efficiency in situations of conflicting preferences., This work was partially supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725), and by grant FIS2015-64349-P (MINECO, Spain / FEDER, UE).
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Tesis doctoral (DoctoralThesis)

Ego-centred models of social networks: the social atom

  • Tamarit, Ignacio
Mención Internacional en el título de doctor, This thesis set out to contribute to the realm of social physics, with a particular focus on human social networks. Our approach, however, is somewhat different from what is typical in disciplines such as complex systems or statistical physics. Rather than simplifying the features of the constituents of our system (people), and stressing their rules of interaction, we focus on better understanding those very same constituents, modelling them as social atoms. Our rationale is that a better understanding of such an atom may shed light on how (and why) it interacts with other atoms to form social collectives. Given its robustness and the evolutionary roots of its premises, we use the Social Brain Hypothesis as our departure point. This theory states that the evolutionary drive behind the development of large brains in humans was the need to process social information and that the limited capacity of our brains imposes a limit to the number of relationships we can manage— the so-called “Dunbar’s number”, roughly 150. Moreover, evidence keeps revealing that these relationships are further organised in a series of hierarchically inclusive layers with decreasing emotional intensity, whose sizes exhibit a more or less constant scaling. Notwithstanding the empirical evidence, neither the presence of scaling in the organisation of personal networks nor its connection with limited cognitive skills had been explained so far. In Chapter 2 we present a mathematical model that solves this puzzle. The assumptions of the model are quite simple, and well founded on empirical evidence. Firstly, the number of relationships we maintain tends to be stable on average. Secondly, these relationships are costly, and our resources are limited. With these two premises, our results show that the hierarchical organisation emerges naturally from the principle of maximum entropy. Not only that, but we also predict a hitherto unnoticed regime of organisation whose existence we prove using several datasets from communities of immigrants. The former model considers that relationships can only belong to a discrete set of categories (layers). In Chapter 3 we extend it so that relationships are classified in a continuum. This modification allows us to test the model with data from very di erent sources such as online communications, face-to-face contacts, and phone calls. Our results show that the two regimes of organisation found in the previous model persist in this variant, and reveal the underlying existence of a (universal) scaling parameter which does not depend on any particular number of layers. To incorporate these ideas into socio-centric models, we build on the so-called Structural Balance Theory. This theory, underpinned by psychological motivations, posits that the structure of social networks of positive and negative relationships are highly interdependent. However, the theory has received little empirical validation, and negative social relationships are poorly understood—both from an ego-centric and a socio-centric perspective. For that reason, we turn to developing an experimental software in order to gather data within a school. In Chapters 4 and 5 we present results from these experiments. In Chapter 4 we analyse the socio-centric networks using machine learning techniques and find that the structure of positive and negative networks is indeed very much connected. Besides, we study the two types of networks separately, showing that they exhibit quite distinct features and that gender efects in negative social networks are weak and asymmetrical for boys and girls. In Chapter 5, on the other hand, we focus on the structure of negative personal networks. Remarkably, using data from two diferent experimental settings, we show that the structure of personal networks of negative relationships mirrors that of the positive ones and exhibits a similar scaling—albeit their size is significantly smaller. Chapter 6 summarises our results and presents future (and current) lines of investigation. Among them, we outline a model of a social fluid that uses the insights gained with this thesis to build a model of social collectives as ensembles of personal networks. This model is compatible, at the micro-level, with the observations of the social brain hypothesis, and, at the macro-level, with the premises of the structural balance theory., This thesis would not have been possible without the support of Fundación BBVA through its 2016 call project ”Los números de Dunbar y la estructura de las sociedades digitales: modelización y simulación (DUNDIG)”, and we are very thankful for it. Support for early stages of this work through projects IBSEN (European Commission, H2020 FET Open RIA 662725) and VARIANCE (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad/FEDER, project no. FIS2015-64349-P) is also acknowledged, Programa Oficial de Doctorado en Ingeniería Matemática por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Presidente: Javier Martín Buldú.- Secretario: José Luis Molina González.- Vocal: Roberta Sinatra
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emergence and evolution of cooperation under resource pressure

  • Pereda, María
  • Zurro, Débora
  • Santos, José I.
  • Briz Godino, Ivan
  • Álvarez, Myrian
  • Caro, Jorge
  • Galán, José Manuel
We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies., The authors acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project CSD2010-00034 (SimulPast CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and HAR2009-06996; from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; and from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725. We also acknowledge assistance from the Santander Supercomputación support group at the University of Cantabria, which provided access to the Altamira Supercomputer at the Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIC), a member of the Spanish Supercomputing Network, for performing simulations/analyses.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A formal model based on Game Theory for the analysis of cooperation in distributed service discovery

  • Martínez-Cánovas, Guillem
  • Hernández, Penélope
  • Del Val Noguera, Elena|||0000-0002-1279-3429
  • Botti V.|||0000-0002-6507-2756
  • Rebollo Pedruelo, Miguel|||0000-0002-5115-8751
New systems can be designed, developed, and managed as societies of agents that interact with each other by offering and providing services. These systems can be viewed as complex networks where nodes are bounded rational agents. In order to deal with complex goals, they require cooperation of the other agents to be able to locate the required services. The aim of this paper is formally and empirically analyze under which circumstances cooperation emerges in decentralized search of services. We propose a repeated game model that formalizes the interactions among agents in a search process where agents are free to choose between cooperate or not in the process. Agents make decisions based on the cost of their actions and the expected reward if they participate forwarding queries in a search process that ends successfully. We propose a strategy that is based on random-walks, and we study under what conditions the strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We performed several experiments in order to evaluate the model and the strategy and to analyze which network structures are more appropriate to promote cooperation. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved., This work is supported by SP2014800, TIN2011-27652-C03-01, TIN2012-36586-C03-01, PROMETEOII/2013/019 and by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology [Project ECO2013-46550-R and FEDER, PROMETEOII/2014/054].
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Quantitative account of social interactions in a mental health care ecosystem: cooperation, trust and collective action

  • Cigarini, Anna
  • Vicens, Julián
  • Duch i Gavaldà, Jordi
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Perelló, Josep, 1974-
Mental disorders have an enormous impact in our society, both in personal terms and in the economic costs associated with their treatment. In order to scale up services and bring down costs, administrations are starting to promote social interactions as key to care provision. We analyze quantitatively the importance of communities for effective mental health care, considering all community members involved. By means of citizen science practices, we have designed a suite of games that allow to probe into different behavioral traits of the role groups of the ecosystem. The evidence reinforces the idea of community social capital, with caregivers and professionals playing a leading role. Yet, the cost of collective action is mainly supported by individuals with a mental condition - which unveils their vulnerability. The results are in general agreement with previous findings but, since we broaden the perspective of previous studies, we are also able to find marked differences in the social behavior of certain groups of mental disorders. We finally point to the conditions under which cooperation among members of the ecosystem is better sustained, suggesting how virtuous cycles of inclusion and participation can be promoted in a 'care in the community' framework.
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation

  • Vicens, Julián
  • Bueno-Guerra, Nereida
  • Gutiérrez-Roig, Mario
  • Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
  • Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús
  • Perelló, Josep, 1974-
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Moreno, Yamir
  • Duch i Gavaldà, Jordi
Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understanding of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a common goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contributing significantly more to the public goods than the richer −sometimes twice as much. An unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behavior, finding the poorest participants within two 'generous clusters' and the richest into a 'greedy cluster'. Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fairness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences

  • Mazzoli, Mattia
  • Sánchez, Ángel
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has addressed this issue by combining the physics of complex networks with a description of interactions in terms of evolutionary game theory. We here take this research a step further by introducing a most salient societal factor such as the individuals' preferences, a characteristic that is key to understanding much of the social phenomenology these days. We consider a heterogeneous, agent-based model in which agents interact strategically with their neighbors, but their preferences and payoffs for the possible actions differ. We study how such a heterogeneous network behaves under evolutionary dynamics and different strategic interactions, namely coordination games and best shot games. With this model we study the emergence of the equilibria predicted analytically in random graphs under best response dynamics, and we extend this test to unexplored contexts like proportional imitation and scale free networks. We show that some theoretically predicted equilibria do not arise in simulations with incomplete information, and we demonstrate the importance of the graph topology and the payoff function parameters for some games. Finally, we discuss our results with the available experimental evidence on coordination games, showing that our model agrees better with the experiment than standard economic theories, and draw hints as to how to maximize social efficiency in situations of conflicting preferences., This work was partially supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725), and by grant FIS2015-64349-P (MINECO, Spain / FEDER, UE)., No
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emergence and Evolution of Cooperation Under Resource Pressure

  • Pereda, María
  • Zurro, Débora
  • Santos Martín, José Ignacio
  • Briz i Godino, Ivan
  • Álvarez, Myrian
  • Caro Saiz, Jorge
  • Galán Ordax, José Manuel
We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies., Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project CSD2010-00034 (SimulPast CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and HAR2009-06996; from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; and from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Robustness assessment of the ‘cooperation under resource pressure’ (CURP) model: Insights on resource availability and sharing practices among hunter-gatherers

  • Zurro, Débora
  • Ahedo García, Virginia
  • Pereda, María
  • Álvarez, Myrian
  • Briz i Godino, Ivan
  • Caro Saiz, Jorge
  • Santos Martín, José Ignacio
  • Galán Ordax, José Manuel
A well-known challenge in archaeological research is the exploration of the social mechanisms that hunter-gatherers may have implemented throughout history to deal with changes in resource availability. The agent-based model (ABM) ‘cooperation under resource pressure’ (CURP) was conceived to explore food stress episodes in societies lacking a food preservation technology. It was particularly aimed at understanding how cooperative behaviours in the form of food sharing practices emerge, increase and may become the prevailing strategy in relation to changes in resource availability and expectancy of reciprocity. CURP’s main outcome is the identification of three regimes of behaviour depending on the stress level. In this work, the model’s robustness to the original selection mechanism (random tournament) is assessed, as different dynamics can lead to different persistent regimes. For that purpose, three other selection mechanisms are implemented and evaluated, to identify the prevailing states of the system. Results show that the three regimes are robust irrespective of the analysed dynamics. We consequently examine in more detail the long-term archaeological implications that these results may have., Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (former Ministry of Science and Innovation): SimulPast Project (CSD2010- 00034 CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010), HAR2009-06996 and CULM Project (HAR2016- 77672-P); from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725 and from the European Social Fund as one of the authors is the recipient of a predoctoral grant from the Department of Education of Junta de Castilla y León (Spain).
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove games

  • Chen, Wei
  • Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
  • Li, Zhiwu
  • Wang, Long
  • Moreno, Yamir
In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource often requires the cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of the Hawk-Dove Game for an arbitrary number of agents: the N-person Hawk-Dove Game. In this model, doves exemplify the cooperative behavior without intraspecies conflict, while hawks represent the aggressive behavior. In the absence of hawks, doves share the resource equally and avoid conflict, but having hawks around lead to doves escaping without fighting. Conversely, hawks fight for the resource at the cost of getting injured. Nevertheless, if doves are present in sufficient number to expel the hawks, they can aggregate to protect the resource, and thus avoid being plundered by hawks. We derive and numerically solve an exact equation for the evolution of the system in both finite and infinite well-mixed populations, finding the conditions for stable coexistence between both species. Furthermore, by varying the different parameters, we found a scenario of bifurcations that leads the system from dominating hawks and coexistence to bi-stability, multiple interior equilibria and dominating doves.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Quantitative account of social interactions in a mental health care ecosystem: cooperation, trust and collective action

  • Cigarini, A.
  • Vicens, J.
  • Duch, J.
  • Sánchez, A.
  • Perelló, J.
Mental disorders have an enormous impact in our society, both in personal terms and in the economic costs associated with their treatment. In order to scale up services and bring down costs, administrations are starting to promote social interactions as key to care provision. We analyze quantitatively the importance of communities for effective mental health care, considering all community members involved. By means of citizen science practices, we have designed a suite of games that allow to probe into different behavioral traits of the role groups of the ecosystem. The evidence reinforces the idea of community social capital, with caregivers and professionals playing a leading role. Yet, the cost of collective action is mainly supported by individuals with a mental condition-which unveils their vulnerability. The results are in general agreement with previous findings but, since we broaden the perspective of previous studies, we are also able to find marked differences in the social behavior of certain groups of mental disorders. We finally point to the conditions under which cooperation among members of the ecosystem is better sustained, suggesting how virtuous cycles of inclusion and participation can be promoted in a "care in the community" framework.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games

  • Antonioni, A.
  • Pereda, M.
  • Cronin, K.A.
  • Tomassini, M.
  • Sánchez, A.
The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner''s Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A networked voting rule for democratic representation

  • Hernández, A.R.
  • Gracia-Lázaro, C.
  • Brigatti, E.
  • Moreno, Y.
We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability of the elected. The results of our simulations suggest that this algorithm-based approach is able to obtain a high representativeness for relatively small committees, performing even better than a classical voting rule based on a closed list of candidates. We show that a general relation between committee size and representatives exists in the form of an inverse square root law and that the normalized committee size approximately scales with the inverse of the community size, allowing the scalability to very large populations. These findings are not strongly influenced by the different networks used to describe the individuals’ interactions, except for the presence of few individuals with very high connectivity which can have a marginal negative effect in the committee selection process.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equal status in Ultimatum Games promotes rational sharing

  • Han, X.
  • Cao, S.
  • Bao, J.-Z.
  • Wang, W.-X.
  • Zhang, B.
  • Gao, Z.-Y.
  • Sánchez, A.
Experiments on the Ultimatum Game (UG) repeatedly show that people''s behaviour is far from rational. In UG experiments, a subject proposes how to divide a pot and the other can accept or reject the proposal, in which case both lose everything. While rational people would offer and accept the minimum possible amount, in experiments low offers are often rejected and offers are typically larger than the minimum, and even fair. Several theoretical works have proposed that these results may arise evolutionarily when subjects act in both roles and there is a fixed interaction structure in the population specifying who plays with whom. We report the first experiments on structured UG with subjects playing simultaneously both roles. We observe that acceptance levels of responders approach rationality and proposers accommodate their offers to their environment. More precisely, subjects keep low acceptance levels all the time, but as proposers they follow a best-response-like approach to choose their offers. We thus find that status equality promotes rational sharing while the influence of structure leads to fairer offers compared to well-mixed populations. Our results are far from what is observed in single-role UG experiments and largely different from available predictions based on evolutionary game theory.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cognitive resource allocation determines the organization of personal networks

  • Tamarit, I.
  • Cuesta, J.A.
  • Dunbar, R.I.M.
  • Sanchez, A.
The typical human personal social network contains about 150 relationships including kin, friends, and acquaintances, organized into a set of hierarchically inclusive layers of increasing size but decreasing emotional intensity. Data from a number of different sources reveal that these inclusive layers exhibit a constant scaling ratio of similar to 3. While the overall size of the networks has been connected to our cognitive capacity, no mechanism explaining why the networks present a layered structure with a consistent scaling has been proposed. Here we show that the existence of a heterogeneous cost to relationships (in terms of time or cognitive investment), together with a limitation in the total capacity an individual has to invest in them, can naturally explain the existence of layers and, when the cost function is linear, explain the scaling between them. We develop a one-parameter Bayesian model that fits the empirical data remarkably well. In addition, the model predicts the existence of a contrasting regime in the case of small communities, such that the layers have an inverted structure (increasing size with increasing emotional intensity). We test the model with five communities and provide clear evidence of the existence of the two predicted regimes. Our model explains, based on first principles, the emergence of structure in the organization of personal networks and allows us to predict a rare phenomenon whose existence we confirm empirically.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation

  • Vicens, J.
  • Bueno-Guerra, N.
  • Gutierrez-Roig, M.
  • Gracia-Lazaro, C.
  • Gomez-Gardeñes, J.
  • Perello, J.
  • Sanchez, A.
  • Moreno, Y.
  • Duch, J.
Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understanding of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a common goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contributing significantly more to the public goods than the richer -sometimes twice as much. An unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behavior, finding the poorest participants within two "generous clusters" and the richest into a "greedy cluster". Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fairness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Intergenerational cooperation within the household: a Public Good game with three generations

  • Molina, J.A.
  • Ferrer, A.
  • Giménez-Nadal, J.I.
  • Gracia-Lázaro, C.
  • Moreno, Y.
  • Sánchez, A.
We analyze cooperation of individuals in a family context, using a Public Good game. In a lab experiment, 165 individuals from 55 three-generation families (youth, parent, and grandparent) play a repeated Public Good game in three different treatments: one in which three members of the same family play each other (family), a second with the youth and two non-family members, while preserving the previous generational structure (inter-generational), and a third in which three randomly-selected players play each other (random). We find that all the age groups cooperate more when playing with relatives, indicating that family ties may have a positive relationship to contributions to the Public Good. We also find that this trend is more evident for the youths and the parents than for the grandparents. Furthermore, young individuals tend to cooperate less than older generations, especially in non-family treatments. Our results serve as evidence of the relationship between family ties and inter-generational cooperative behaviors.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games

  • Pereda, M.
  • Capraro, V.
  • Sánchez, A.
Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger groups, while others that cooperation is easier in larger groups, and yet others that cooperation attains its maximum in intermediate size groups. Here we add to this field of work by reporting a two-treatment empirical study where subjects play a Public Goods Game with a Critical Mass, such that the return for full cooperation increases linearly for early contributions and then stabilizes after a critical mass is reached (the two treatments differ only on the critical mass). We choose this game for two reasons: it has been argued that it approximates real-life social dilemmas; previous work suggests that, in this case, group size might have an inverted-U effect on cooperation, where the pick of cooperation is reached around the critical mass. Our main innovation with respect to previous experiments is that we implement a within-subject design, such that the same subject plays in groups of different size (from 5 to 40 subjects). Groups are formed at random at every round and there is no feedback. This allows us to explore if and how subjects change their choice as a function of the size of the group. We report three main results, which partially contrast what has been suggested by previous work: in our setting (i) the critical mass has no effect on cooperation; (ii) group size has a positive effect on cooperation; (iii) the most chosen option (played by about 50% of the subjects) is All Defection, followed by All Cooperation (about 10% of the subjects), whereas the rest have a slight trend to switch preferentially from defection to cooperation as the group size increases.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Robustness of cultural communities in an open-ended Axelrod's model

  • Hernández, A.R.
  • Gracia-Lázaro, C.
  • Brigatti, E.
  • Moreno, Y.
We consider an open-ended set of cultural features in the Axelrod model of cultural dissemination. By replacing the features in which a high degree of consensus is achieved by new ones, we address here an essential ingredient of societies: the evolution of topics as a result of social dynamics and debate. Our results show that, once cultural clusters have been formed, the introduction of new topics into the social debate has little effect on them, but it does have a significant influence on the cultural overlap. Along with the Monte Carlo simulations, we derive and numerically solve an equation for the stationary cultural overlap based on a mean-field approach which reproduces the qualitative behavior of the model.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An experimental study of network effects on coordination in asymmetric games

  • Broere, Joris
  • Buskens, Vincent
  • Stoof, Henk
  • Sánchez, Angel
Network structure has often proven to be important in understanding the decision behavior of individuals or agents in different interdependent situations. Computational studies predict that network structure has a crucial influence on behavior in iterated 2 by 2 asymmetric ‘battle of the sexes’ games. We test such behavioral predictions in an experiment with 240 human subjects. We found that as expected the less ‘random’ the network structure, the better the experimental results are predictable by the computational models. In particular, there is an effect of network clustering on the heterogeneity of convergence behavior in the network. We also found that degree centrality and having an even degree are important predictors of the decision behavior of the subjects in the experiment. We thus find empirical validation of predictions made by computational models in a computerized experiment with human subjects.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Effect of network topology and node centrality on trading

  • Maciel Cardoso, Felipe
  • Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
  • Moisan, F.
  • Goyal, S.
  • Sánchez, Ángel
  • Moreno, Yamir
Global supply networks in agriculture, manufacturing, and services are a defining feature of the modern world. The efficiency and the distribution of surpluses across different parts of these networks depend on the choices of intermediaries. This paper conducts price formation experiments with human subjects located in large complex networks to develop a better understanding of the principles governing behavior. Our first experimental finding is that prices are larger and that trade is significantly less efficient in small-world networks as compared to random networks. Our second experimental finding is that location within a network is not an important determinant of pricing. An examination of the price dynamics suggests that traders on cheapest—and hence active—paths raise prices while those off these paths lower them. We construct an agent-based model (ABM) that embodies this rule of thumb. Simulations of this ABM yield macroscopic patterns consistent with the experimental findings. Finally, we extrapolate the ABM on to significantly larger random and small-world networks and find that network topology remains a key determinant of pricing and efficiency.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Behavioural patterns behind the demise of the commons across different cultures

  • Jusup, M.
  • Maciel-Cardoso, F.
  • Gracia-Lazaro, C.
  • Liu, C.
  • Wang, Z.
  • Moreno, Y.
Common-pool resources require a dose of self-restraint to ensure sustainable exploitation, but this has often proven elusive in practice. To understand why, and characterize behaviours towards ecological systems in general, we devised a social dilemma experiment in which participants gain profit from harvesting a virtual forest vulnerable to overexploitation. Out of 16 Chinese and 15 Spanish player groups, only one group from each country converged to the forest's maximum sustainable yield. All other groups were overzealous, with about half of them surpassing or on the way to surpass a no-recovery threshold. Comp utational-statistical analyses attribute such outcomes to an interplay between three prominent player behaviours, two of which are subject to decision-making "inertia" that causes near blindness to the resource state. These behaviours, being equally pervasive among players from both nations, imply that the commons fall victim to behavioural patterns robust to confounding factors such as age, education and culture.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emergence and evolution of cooperation under resource pressure

  • Pereda, María
  • Zurro, Débora
  • Santos, José I.
  • Briz Godino, Ivan
  • Álvarez, Myrian
  • Caro, Jorge
  • Galán, José Manuel
We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies., The authors acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation Project CSD2010-00034 (SimulPast CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and HAR2009-06996; from the Argentine National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET): Project PIP-0706; from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research: Project GR7846; and from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725. We also acknowledge assistance from the Santander Supercomputación support group at the University of Cantabria, which provided access to the Altamira Supercomputer at the Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIC), a member of the Spanish Supercomputing Network, for performing simulations/analyses.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation

  • Vicens, Julián
  • Bueno-Guerra, Nereida
  • Gutiérrez-Roig, Mario
  • Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
  • Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús
  • Perelló, Josep, 1974-
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Moreno, Yamir
  • Duch i Gavaldà, Jordi
Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understanding of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a common goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contributing significantly more to the public goods than the richer −sometimes twice as much. An unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behavior, finding the poorest participants within two 'generous clusters' and the richest into a 'greedy cluster'. Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fairness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Quantitative account of social interactions in a mental health care ecosystem: cooperation, trust and collective action

  • Cigarini, Anna
  • Vicens, Julián
  • Duch i Gavaldà, Jordi
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Perelló, Josep, 1974-
Mental disorders have an enormous impact in our society, both in personal terms and in the economic costs associated with their treatment. In order to scale up services and bring down costs, administrations are starting to promote social interactions as key to care provision. We analyze quantitatively the importance of communities for effective mental health care, considering all community members involved. By means of citizen science practices, we have designed a suite of games that allow to probe into different behavioral traits of the role groups of the ecosystem. The evidence reinforces the idea of community social capital, with caregivers and professionals playing a leading role. Yet, the cost of collective action is mainly supported by individuals with a mental condition - which unveils their vulnerability. The results are in general agreement with previous findings but, since we broaden the perspective of previous studies, we are also able to find marked differences in the social behavior of certain groups of mental disorders. We finally point to the conditions under which cooperation among members of the ecosystem is better sustained, suggesting how virtuous cycles of inclusion and participation can be promoted in a 'care in the community' framework.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Emergence and evolution of cooperation under resource Ppressure

  • Pereda, María
  • Zurro Hernández, Débora|||0000-0003-2498-9338
  • Santos, José I.
  • Briz i Godino, Ivan|||0000-0002-6262-9360
  • Álvarez, Myrian|||0000-0002-1931-8428
  • Caro Saiz, Jorge|||0000-0002-5065-4841
  • Galán, José Manuel|||0000-0003-3360-7602
We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies.