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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
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Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation

  • Xia, C.
  • Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
  • Moreno, Yamir
The understanding of cooperative behavior in social systems has been the subject of intense research over the past few decades. In this regard, the theoretical models used to explain cooperation in human societies have been complemented with a growing interest in experimental studies to validate the proposed mechanisms. In this work, we rely on previous experimental findings to build a theoretical model based on two cooperation driving mechanisms: second-order reputation and memory. Specifically, taking the donation game as a starting point, the agents are distributed among three strategies, namely, unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and discriminators, where the latter follow a second-order assessment rule: shunning, stern judging, image scoring, or simple standing. A discriminator will cooperate if the evaluation of the recipient''s last actions contained in his memory is above a threshold of (in)tolerance. In addition to the dynamics inherent to the game, another imitation dynamics, involving much longer times (generations), is introduced. The model is approached through a mean-field approximation that predicts the macroscopic behavior observed in Monte Carlo simulations. We found that, while in most second-order assessment rules, intolerance hinders cooperation, it has the opposite (positive) effect under the simple standing rule. Furthermore, we show that, when considering memory, the stern judging rule shows the lowest values of cooperation, while stricter rules show higher cooperation levels.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Behavioural patterns behind the demise of the commons across different cultures

  • Jusup, M.
  • Maciel-Cardoso, F.
  • Gracia-Lazaro, C.
  • Liu, C.
  • Wang, Z.
  • Moreno, Y.
Common-pool resources require a dose of self-restraint to ensure sustainable exploitation, but this has often proven elusive in practice. To understand why, and characterize behaviours towards ecological systems in general, we devised a social dilemma experiment in which participants gain profit from harvesting a virtual forest vulnerable to overexploitation. Out of 16 Chinese and 15 Spanish player groups, only one group from each country converged to the forest's maximum sustainable yield. All other groups were overzealous, with about half of them surpassing or on the way to surpass a no-recovery threshold. Comp utational-statistical analyses attribute such outcomes to an interplay between three prominent player behaviours, two of which are subject to decision-making "inertia" that causes near blindness to the resource state. These behaviours, being equally pervasive among players from both nations, imply that the commons fall victim to behavioural patterns robust to confounding factors such as age, education and culture.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dynamics of heuristics selection for cooperative behaviour

  • Maciel Cardoso, F.
  • Gracia-Lázaro, C.
  • Moreno, Y.
Situations involving cooperative behaviour are widespread among animals and humans alike. Game theory and evolutionary dynamics have provided the theoretical and computational grounds to understand what are the mechanisms that allow for such cooperation. Studies in this area usually take into consideration different behavioural strategies and investigate how they can be fixed in the population under evolving rules. However, how those strategies emerged from basic evolutionary mechanisms continues to be not fully understood. To address this issue, here we study the emergence of cooperative strategies through a model of heuristics selection based on evolutionary algorithms. In the proposed model, agents interact with other players according to a heuristic specified by their genetic code and reproduce—at a longer time scale—proportionally to their fitness. We show that the system can evolve to cooperative regimes for low mutation rates through heuristics selection while increasing the mutation decreases the level of cooperation. Our analysis of possible strategies shows that reciprocity and punishment are the main ingredients for cooperation to emerge, and the emerging heuristics would likely cooperate in one-shot interactions. Additionally, we show that if in addition to behavioural rules, genetic relatedness is included, then kinship plays a relevant role, changing emerging strategies significantly. Our results illustrate that our evolutionary heuristics model is a generic and powerful tool to study the evolution of cooperative behaviour.