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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 10
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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions

  • Ollár, Mariann
  • Penta, Antonio
We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer. First, we characterize all incentive compatible transfers under these assumptions. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, that only elicit payoff relevant information, and the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. The full implementation results obtain from showing that the problem can be transformed into one of designing a network of strategic externalities, subject to suitable constraints which are dictated by the incentive compatibility requirements., The BSE benefited from the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Antonio Penta acknowledges the financial support of the European Research Council, Starting Grant 759424.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis

  • Decarolis, Francesco
  • Goldmanis, Maris
  • Penta, Antonio
  • Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%., The BSE acknowledges the financialsupport of the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S).Francesco Decarolis acknowledges financial support from the PRIN 2017. Antonio Pentaacknowledges financial support from the ERC Starting Grant #759424.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Efficient full implementation via transfers: uniqueness and sensitivity in symmetric environments

  • Ollár, Mariann
  • Penta, Antonio
The BSE benefited from the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Antonio Penta also acknowledges the financial support of the European Research Council (ERC), ERC Starting Grant #759424.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions

  • Decarolis, Francesco
  • Goldmanis, Maris
  • Penta, Antonio
The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency., A. Penta acknowledgesfinancial support from the European Research Council Starting Grant[Grant 759424].
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Weinstein, Jonathan
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICRλ, where λ is a sequence whose term λn is the probability players attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes., Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2017-89240-P, AEI/FEDER, UE, and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563). Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial help from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, from the Department of Language Policy and Culture of the Basque Government (grants ECO2012-31346 and POS-2015-1-0022 and IT568-13, respectively) and the ERC Starting Grant #759424, and thanks Northwestern University (both the Department of Economics and the Math Center at MEDS Department) for generous hospitality.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions

  • Ollár, Mariann
  • Penta, Antonio
We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer. First, we characterize all incentive compatible transfers under these assumptions. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, that only elicit payoff relevant information, and the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. The full implementation results obtain from showing that the problem can be transformed into one of designing a network of strategic externalities, subject to suitable constraints which are dictated by the incentive compatibility requirements., The BSE benefited from the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Antonio Penta acknowledges the financial support of the European Research Council, Starting Grant 759424.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions

  • Decarolis, Francesco
  • Goldmanis, Maris
  • Penta, Antonio
The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency., A. Penta acknowledgesfinancial support from the European Research Council Starting Grant[Grant 759424].
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis

  • Decarolis, Francesco
  • Goldmanis, Maris
  • Penta, Antonio
  • Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%., The BSE acknowledges the financialsupport of the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S).Francesco Decarolis acknowledges financial support from the PRIN 2017. Antonio Pentaacknowledges financial support from the ERC Starting Grant #759424.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Efficient full implementation via transfers: uniqueness and sensitivity in symmetric environments

  • Ollár, Mariann
  • Penta, Antonio
The BSE benefited from the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Antonio Penta also acknowledges the financial support of the European Research Council (ERC), ERC Starting Grant #759424.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Weinstein, Jonathan
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICRλ, where λ is a sequence whose term λn is the probability players attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes., Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2017-89240-P, AEI/FEDER, UE, and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563). Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial help from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, from the Department of Language Policy and Culture of the Basque Government (grants ECO2012-31346 and POS-2015-1-0022 and IT568-13, respectively) and the ERC Starting Grant #759424, and thanks Northwestern University (both the Department of Economics and the Math Center at MEDS Department) for generous hospitality.