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INCENTIVOS, INFORMACION E INSTITUCIONES. TEORIA Y APLICACIONES.

ECO2017-89240-P

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2017
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 16
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Inequality, bipolarization, and tax progressivity

  • Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
  • Llavador, Humberto
The steady rise in income and wealth inequality in the last four decades, together with the evolution of a vanishing middle class, has raised concerns about potentially pernicious effects of these trends on social stability and economic growth. This paper evaluates the possibility of designing tax systems aimed at reducing income inequality and bipolarization. Using two fundamentally different metrics, we provide a unified foundation of tax progressivity whereby, roughly, taxes are progressive if and only if they are inequality reducing; and taxes are inequality reducing if and only if they are bipolarization reducing., Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), the AEI/FEDER-UE (PGC2018-096370-B-100) and the AEI/FEDER-EU (ECO2017-89240-P).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

The Few-get-richer: a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Gómez, Vicenç
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Comunicació presentada a: the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW ’19), celebrat a San Francisco, Estat Units d'Amèrica, del 13 al 17 de maig de 2019., Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items (e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources), and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate analytically that the few-get-richer effect emerges when people tend to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting and human behavior.We also test our predictions experimentally in an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have important implications to understand the spread of misinformation., F. Germano acknowledges financial support from Grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) from the Spanish MINECO. G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from Ramon y Cajal Fellowship RYC-2014-15035 and Grant #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353 from the Spanish MINECO, and ERC Consolidator Grant #772268 from the European Commission. V. Gómez is funded by the Ramon y Cajal program RYC-2015-18878 (AEI/MINECO/FSE,UE) and the María de Maeztu Units of Excellence Programme (MDM-2015-0502). The research leading to these results has received funding from “La Caixa" Banking Foundation. Data from the experiment are available at https://osf.io/nwjyf/.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Entropy, directionality theory and the evolution of income inequality

  • Germano, Fabrizio
A macro-evolutionary theory of income inequality is proposed that is based on a society’s dynamic income generating process. Two types of processes are distinguished, namely dispersing and concentrating ones. A basic result shows that dispersing processes provide a selective advantage for more balanced and mutualistic interaction; whereas concentrating ones favor weaker, less balanced and less mutualistic interaction. We also show that societies with more balanced and mutualistic interaction induce more income equality and a non-stratified society, while less balanced and less mutualistic ones induce more inequality and a possibly stratified society. Also, more equal societies are more resilient in the sense of being quicker to recover from shocks and return to steady state than less equal ones. Stylized examples of pre-modern and modern societies are briefly discussed., Finally, I thank AMSE-IMéRA at Aix-Marseille Université and the European University Institute in Florence for generous hospitality, and acknowledge financial support from Grants PID2020-115044GB-I00//AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE), and from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). All errors are my own.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Sobbrio, Francesco
Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix., Ranking algorithms are the information gatekeepers of the Internet era. We develop a stylized model to study the interplay between a ranking algorithm and individual clicking behavior. We consider a search engine that uses an algorithm based on popularity and on personalization. The analysis shows the presence of a feedback effect, whereby individuals clicking on websites indirectly provide information about their private signals to successive searchers through the popularity-ranking algorithm. Accordingly, when individuals provide sufficiently positive feedback to the ranking algorithm, popularity-based rankings tend to aggregate information while personalization acts in the opposite direction. Moreover, we find that, under fairly general conditions, popularity-based rankings generate an advantage of the fewer effect: fewer websites reporting a given signal attract relatively more traffic overall. This highlights a novel, ranking-driven channel that can potentially explain the diffusion of misinformation, as websites reporting incorrect information may attract an amplified amount of traffic precisely because they are few., Germano acknowledges financial support from grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE), from Fundación BBVA (grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”) and also from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Elasticity determinants of inequality-reducing income taxation

  • Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
  • Llavador, Humberto
Includes supplementary material for the online appendix, The link between income inequality and progressive taxation has long been considered a fundamental normative foundation for income tax progressivity. This paper furnishes necessary and sufficient conditions on primitives, in terms of the elasticity of income with respect to ability, under which various subclasses of progressive taxes are inequality reducing. The distributional effects of progressive income taxation are decomposed into two conditions on the wage elasticity of income, the tax rate effect and the subsidy effect, each capturing different aspects of the transition between before-tax and after-tax income distributions. The results confer a degree of useful flexibility to the theory, in that they allow the analyst to expand the universe of consumer preferences by suitably restricting the set of marginal-rate progressive taxes. As an illustration of the results’ practical implications, we provide a precise characterization of the subclass of (progressive) taxes that are inequality reducing for the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and the quasi-linear utility functions., This paper benefited from valuable comments made by the anonymous referees. Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), the AEI/FEDER-UE (PGC2018-096370-B-100) and the AEI/FEDER-EU (ECO2017-89240-P).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Underpromise and overdeliver? Online product reviews and firm pricing

  • Martin, Simon
  • Shelegia, Sandro
We consider a signaling model capturing the introductory and the mature phase of a product. Information concerning product quality is transmitted between consumers through reviews, which partially depend on the expectations consumers had prior to their purchase. When future sales are sufficiently important, a novel tension arises: High-quality types may want to underpromise and overdeliver by imitating low types in order to get a better review. We show the existence of a Pareto-improving separating equilibrium. Both more informative reviews and price transparency can lead to higher prices. Our analysis reveals a new rationale for loss-leadership., Martin thankfully acknowledges financial support from the Vienna Graduate School of Economics. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grants ECO2017-89240-P and ECO2014-59225-P.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Time scarcity and the market for news

  • Alaoui, Larbi
  • Germano, Fabrizio
We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. Time-constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets. They choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip, thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet. Firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We show that even when readers (or television viewers) and firms are rational and unbiased, they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer. In particular, relevant news items may be crowded out. We then study how reader-efficient standards can be restored, and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media. These include tabloidization and polarization of the news, and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media, including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout., The authors acknowledge financial support from the Fundación BBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under grant RYC-2016-21127 (Alaoui), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project grants ECO2014-56154-P and PGC2018-098949-B-I00 (Alaoui) and ECO2017-89240-P (Germano), as well as through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Weinstein, Jonathan
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICRλ, where λ is a sequence whose term λn is the probability players attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes., Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2017-89240-P, AEI/FEDER, UE, and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563). Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial help from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, from the Department of Language Policy and Culture of the Basque Government (grants ECO2012-31346 and POS-2015-1-0022 and IT568-13, respectively) and the ERC Starting Grant #759424, and thanks Northwestern University (both the Department of Economics and the Math Center at MEDS Department) for generous hospitality.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Sobbrio, Francesco
Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix., Ranking algorithms are the information gatekeepers of the Internet era. We develop a stylized model to study the interplay between a ranking algorithm and individual clicking behavior. We consider a search engine that uses an algorithm based on popularity and on personalization. The analysis shows the presence of a feedback effect, whereby individuals clicking on websites indirectly provide information about their private signals to successive searchers through the popularity-ranking algorithm. Accordingly, when individuals provide sufficiently positive feedback to the ranking algorithm, popularity-based rankings tend to aggregate information while personalization acts in the opposite direction. Moreover, we find that, under fairly general conditions, popularity-based rankings generate an advantage of the fewer effect: fewer websites reporting a given signal attract relatively more traffic overall. This highlights a novel, ranking-driven channel that can potentially explain the diffusion of misinformation, as websites reporting incorrect information may attract an amplified amount of traffic precisely because they are few., Germano acknowledges financial support from grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE), from Fundación BBVA (grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”) and also from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

The Few-get-richer: a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Gómez, Vicenç
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Comunicació presentada a: the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW ’19), celebrat a San Francisco, Estat Units d'Amèrica, del 13 al 17 de maig de 2019., Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items (e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources), and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate analytically that the few-get-richer effect emerges when people tend to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting and human behavior.We also test our predictions experimentally in an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have important implications to understand the spread of misinformation., F. Germano acknowledges financial support from Grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) from the Spanish MINECO. G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from Ramon y Cajal Fellowship RYC-2014-15035 and Grant #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353 from the Spanish MINECO, and ERC Consolidator Grant #772268 from the European Commission. V. Gómez is funded by the Ramon y Cajal program RYC-2015-18878 (AEI/MINECO/FSE,UE) and the María de Maeztu Units of Excellence Programme (MDM-2015-0502). The research leading to these results has received funding from “La Caixa" Banking Foundation. Data from the experiment are available at https://osf.io/nwjyf/.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Underpromise and overdeliver? Online product reviews and firm pricing

  • Martin, Simon
  • Shelegia, Sandro
We consider a signaling model capturing the introductory and the mature phase of a product. Information concerning product quality is transmitted between consumers through reviews, which partially depend on the expectations consumers had prior to their purchase. When future sales are sufficiently important, a novel tension arises: High-quality types may want to underpromise and overdeliver by imitating low types in order to get a better review. We show the existence of a Pareto-improving separating equilibrium. Both more informative reviews and price transparency can lead to higher prices. Our analysis reveals a new rationale for loss-leadership., Martin thankfully acknowledges financial support from the Vienna Graduate School of Economics. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grants ECO2017-89240-P and ECO2014-59225-P.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Entropy, directionality theory and the evolution of income inequality

  • Germano, Fabrizio
A macro-evolutionary theory of income inequality is proposed that is based on a society’s dynamic income generating process. Two types of processes are distinguished, namely dispersing and concentrating ones. A basic result shows that dispersing processes provide a selective advantage for more balanced and mutualistic interaction; whereas concentrating ones favor weaker, less balanced and less mutualistic interaction. We also show that societies with more balanced and mutualistic interaction induce more income equality and a non-stratified society, while less balanced and less mutualistic ones induce more inequality and a possibly stratified society. Also, more equal societies are more resilient in the sense of being quicker to recover from shocks and return to steady state than less equal ones. Stylized examples of pre-modern and modern societies are briefly discussed., Finally, I thank AMSE-IMéRA at Aix-Marseille Université and the European University Institute in Florence for generous hospitality, and acknowledge financial support from Grants PID2020-115044GB-I00//AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE), and from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). All errors are my own.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Weinstein, Jonathan
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICRλ, where λ is a sequence whose term λn is the probability players attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes., Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2017-89240-P, AEI/FEDER, UE, and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563). Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial help from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, from the Department of Language Policy and Culture of the Basque Government (grants ECO2012-31346 and POS-2015-1-0022 and IT568-13, respectively) and the ERC Starting Grant #759424, and thanks Northwestern University (both the Department of Economics and the Math Center at MEDS Department) for generous hospitality.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Elasticity determinants of inequality-reducing income taxation

  • Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
  • Llavador, Humberto
Includes supplementary material for the online appendix, The link between income inequality and progressive taxation has long been considered a fundamental normative foundation for income tax progressivity. This paper furnishes necessary and sufficient conditions on primitives, in terms of the elasticity of income with respect to ability, under which various subclasses of progressive taxes are inequality reducing. The distributional effects of progressive income taxation are decomposed into two conditions on the wage elasticity of income, the tax rate effect and the subsidy effect, each capturing different aspects of the transition between before-tax and after-tax income distributions. The results confer a degree of useful flexibility to the theory, in that they allow the analyst to expand the universe of consumer preferences by suitably restricting the set of marginal-rate progressive taxes. As an illustration of the results’ practical implications, we provide a precise characterization of the subclass of (progressive) taxes that are inequality reducing for the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and the quasi-linear utility functions., This paper benefited from valuable comments made by the anonymous referees. Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), the AEI/FEDER-UE (PGC2018-096370-B-100) and the AEI/FEDER-EU (ECO2017-89240-P).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Time scarcity and the market for news

  • Alaoui, Larbi
  • Germano, Fabrizio
We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. Time-constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets. They choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip, thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet. Firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We show that even when readers (or television viewers) and firms are rational and unbiased, they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer. In particular, relevant news items may be crowded out. We then study how reader-efficient standards can be restored, and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media. These include tabloidization and polarization of the news, and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media, including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout., The authors acknowledge financial support from the Fundación BBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under grant RYC-2016-21127 (Alaoui), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project grants ECO2014-56154-P and PGC2018-098949-B-I00 (Alaoui) and ECO2017-89240-P (Germano), as well as through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Inequality, bipolarization, and tax progressivity

  • Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
  • Llavador, Humberto
The steady rise in income and wealth inequality in the last four decades, together with the evolution of a vanishing middle class, has raised concerns about potentially pernicious effects of these trends on social stability and economic growth. This paper evaluates the possibility of designing tax systems aimed at reducing income inequality and bipolarization. Using two fundamentally different metrics, we provide a unified foundation of tax progressivity whereby, roughly, taxes are progressive if and only if they are inequality reducing; and taxes are inequality reducing if and only if they are bipolarization reducing., Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), the AEI/FEDER-UE (PGC2018-096370-B-100) and the AEI/FEDER-EU (ECO2017-89240-P).