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OMPORTAMIENTO ESTRATEGICO Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES.

ECO2014-59225-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2014
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Underpromise and overdeliver? Online product reviews and firm pricing

  • Martin, Simon
  • Shelegia, Sandro
We consider a signaling model capturing the introductory and the mature phase of a product. Information concerning product quality is transmitted between consumers through reviews, which partially depend on the expectations consumers had prior to their purchase. When future sales are sufficiently important, a novel tension arises: High-quality types may want to underpromise and overdeliver by imitating low types in order to get a better review. We show the existence of a Pareto-improving separating equilibrium. Both more informative reviews and price transparency can lead to higher prices. Our analysis reveals a new rationale for loss-leadership., Martin thankfully acknowledges financial support from the Vienna Graduate School of Economics. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grants ECO2017-89240-P and ECO2014-59225-P.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income

  • Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
  • Llavador, Humberto
The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes—in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income—ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result has been criticized on the grounds that it ignores the possible disincentive effect of taxation on work effort, and the resolution of this critique has been a longstanding problem in public finance. This paper provides a normative rationale for progressivity that takes into account the effect of an income tax on labor supply. It shows that a tax schedule is inequality reducing only if it is progressive—in the sense of increasing marginal tax rates on income—and identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on primitives under which progressive and only progressive taxes are inequality reducing., Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through research grants ECO-2014-59225-P and ECO-2015-6755-P.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players’ behavior deviates from rationality, but rather, on players’ higher-order beliefs about the frequency of such deviations. We assume that there exists a probability p such that all players believe, with at least probability p, that their opponents play rationally. This, together with the assumption of a common prior, leads to what we call the set of p-rational outcomes, which we define and characterize for arbitrary probability p. We then show that this set varies continuously in p and converges to the set of correlated equilibria as p approaches 1, thus establishing robustness of the correlated equilibrium concept to relaxing rationality and common knowledge of rationality. The p-rational outcomes are easy to compute, also for games of incomplete information. Importantly, they can be applied to observed frequencies of play for arbitrary normal-form games to derive a measure of rationality p that bounds from below the probability with which any given player chooses actions consistent with payoff maximization and common knowledge of payoff maximization., Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59225-P), as well as from the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant ECO2009-11213), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2012-31326) and from the Basque Government (Grants IT568-13 and POS-2015-1-0022).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Underpromise and overdeliver? Online product reviews and firm pricing

  • Martin, Simon
  • Shelegia, Sandro
We consider a signaling model capturing the introductory and the mature phase of a product. Information concerning product quality is transmitted between consumers through reviews, which partially depend on the expectations consumers had prior to their purchase. When future sales are sufficiently important, a novel tension arises: High-quality types may want to underpromise and overdeliver by imitating low types in order to get a better review. We show the existence of a Pareto-improving separating equilibrium. Both more informative reviews and price transparency can lead to higher prices. Our analysis reveals a new rationale for loss-leadership., Martin thankfully acknowledges financial support from the Vienna Graduate School of Economics. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grants ECO2017-89240-P and ECO2014-59225-P.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players’ behavior deviates from rationality, but rather, on players’ higher-order beliefs about the frequency of such deviations. We assume that there exists a probability p such that all players believe, with at least probability p, that their opponents play rationally. This, together with the assumption of a common prior, leads to what we call the set of p-rational outcomes, which we define and characterize for arbitrary probability p. We then show that this set varies continuously in p and converges to the set of correlated equilibria as p approaches 1, thus establishing robustness of the correlated equilibrium concept to relaxing rationality and common knowledge of rationality. The p-rational outcomes are easy to compute, also for games of incomplete information. Importantly, they can be applied to observed frequencies of play for arbitrary normal-form games to derive a measure of rationality p that bounds from below the probability with which any given player chooses actions consistent with payoff maximization and common knowledge of payoff maximization., Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59225-P), as well as from the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant ECO2009-11213), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2012-31326) and from the Basque Government (Grants IT568-13 and POS-2015-1-0022).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income

  • Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
  • Llavador, Humberto
The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes—in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income—ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result has been criticized on the grounds that it ignores the possible disincentive effect of taxation on work effort, and the resolution of this critique has been a longstanding problem in public finance. This paper provides a normative rationale for progressivity that takes into account the effect of an income tax on labor supply. It shows that a tax schedule is inequality reducing only if it is progressive—in the sense of increasing marginal tax rates on income—and identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on primitives under which progressive and only progressive taxes are inequality reducing., Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through research grants ECO-2014-59225-P and ECO-2015-6755-P.