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ECONOMIA EXPERIMENTAL, MERCADOS BILATERALES Y BIENESTAR SUBJETIVO

ECO2014-59302-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2014
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 24
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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
Minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by Hafalir et al. (2013) in the context of school choice. In a laboratory experiment, we find that adding minority reserves to the GS and TTC mechanisms has positive effects on stability but is quite disappointing in terms of efficiency. Also GS induces higher rates of truth-telling by minority students and thus outclasses TTC., The first author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075). He also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under project reference no. PTDC/EGE-ECO/113403/2009. The third author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2012–31985), Peer Reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An experimental study of persuasion bias and social influence in networks

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Giritligil, Ayça Ebru
  • Weber, Roberto A.
In many areas of social life, individuals receive information about a particular issue of interest from multiple sources. When these sources are connected through a network, then proper aggregation of this information by an individual involves taking into account the structure of this network. The inability to aggregate properly may lead to various types of distortions. In our experiment, four agents all want to find out the value of a particular parameter unknown to all. Agents receive private signals about the parameter and can communicate their estimates of the parameter repeatedly through a network, the structure of which is known by all players. We present results from experiments with three different networks. We find that the information of agents who have more outgoing links in a network gets more weight in the information aggregation of the other agents than under optimal updating. Our results are consistent with the model of >persuasion bias> of DeMarzo et al. (2013. Q. J. Econ., 909) and at odds with an alternative heuristic according to which the most influential agents are those with more incoming links., Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), the Barcelona GSE Research Support Program and Consolider-Ingenio is gratefully acknowledged, Peer Reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Hiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: A laboratory experiment

  • Angelovski, Andrej
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Solà, Carles
In many organizations the measurement of job performance cannot rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers' and co-employees' subjective evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data from three different treatments. For all three treatments we find escalation bias by managers. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. For three treatments we find that managers' and employees' biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair, the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), Peer Reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study experimentally in the laboratory two 2-player games that mimic a decentralized decision-making situation in which firms repeatedly outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. The first game has a unique (inefficient) equilibrium in mixed strategies, while the second game has two (efficient) equilibria in pure strategies and an infinite number of (inefficient) equilibria in mixed strategies. In both games, the optimal social costs can also be obtained via dominated strategies. We find that only in the second game subjects manage to reach an efficient outcome more often when matched in fixed pairs than when randomly rematched each round. Surprisingly, this is because subjects coordinate on dominated strategies (and not an efficient pure strategy equilibrium). We show theoretically that preferences for efficiency cannot explain our experimental results. Inequality aversion, on the other hand, cannot be rejected., F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). He also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces. M. Vorsatz gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2012–31985 and ECO2015–65701–P)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
We study the structure of the set of (Nash) equilibria of a deferred acceptance game with complete lists: for a given marriage market with complete lists, men propose to women truthfully while women can accept or reject proposals strategically throughout the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Zhou (1991) studied this game and showed that a matching that is stable with respect to the true preferences can be supported by some preference profile (possibly a non-equilibrium one) if and only if it can be supported by an equilibrium as well. In particular, this result implies the existence of equilibria since the men-optimal stable matching is supported by true preferences and hence an equilibrium outcome. We answer an open question Zhou posed by showing that there need not exist an equilibrium matching that weakly dominates all other equilibrium matchings from the women’s point of view (Theorem 2)., B. Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNFS). F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding., B. Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) for Project 100018_156201. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The price of luck: paying for the hot hand of others

  • Bou, Silvia
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Cayón, Magda
  • Guillén, Pablo
We report on the results of an experiment with a statistical choice task involving the toss of a fair coin. In our experiment, participants had to decide whether they were willing to pay a price to switch from betting on the future performance of one player to betting on that of another player. The switch was from a player who had been previously less successful in betting on five coin flips to another one who had been more successful in the same task. We conducted a treatment with the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism and one in which participants were faced with a fixed price. In both cases, participants exhibit a strong bias towards placing their bets on players with a good guessing history in the coin toss task. Participants’ behaviour is compatible with prescriptive luck beliefs, that is, the idea that luck is a somehow deterministic and personal attribute., The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB–Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair, the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), and the Barcelona GSE., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stand by me experiments on help and commitment in coordination games

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Cooper, David J.
  • Fatás, Enrique
  • Qi, Shi
We present experiments studying how high-ability individuals use help to foster efficient coordination. After an initial phase that traps groups in a low-productivity equilibrium, incentives to coordinate are increased, making it possible to escape this performance trap. The design varies whether high-ability individuals can offer help and, if so, whether they must commit to help for an extended period. If help is chosen on a round-by-round basis, the probability of escaping the performance trap is slightly reduced by allowing for help. The likelihood of success significantly improves if high-ability individuals must commit to help for an extended time. We develop and estimate a structural model of sophisticated learning that provides an explanation for why commitment is necessary. The key insight is that potential leaders who are overly optimistic about their ability to teach their followers are too fast to eliminate help in the absence of commitment., The authors thank the National Science Foundation [SES0214310 and SES-1127704], the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [ECO2014-59302-P], the Generalitat de Catalunya [2014 SGR 510], and the Barcelona GSE Research Network for financial help., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Centralized vs. decentralized management: an experimental study

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Cooper, David J.
Trabajo presentado en el Micro Seminars EUR organizado por el Tinbergen Institute y celebrado en Rotterdam el 1 de abril de 2016, We introduce a new game to the experimental literature and use it to study how behavioral phenomena affect the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management. Our game models an organization with two divisions and one central manager. Each division must choose or be assigned a product. Ignoring asymmetric information, the underlying game is an asymmetric coordination game related to the Battle of the Sexes. In equilibrium, the divisions coordinate on identical products. Each division prefers an equilibrium where the selected products are closest to its local tastes while central management prefers the efficient equilibrium, determined by a randomly state of the world, which maximizes total payoffs. The state of the world is known to the divisions, but the central manager only learns about it through messages from the divisions who have incentives to lie. Contrary to the theory, overall performance is higher under centralization, where the central manager assigns products to divisions after receiving messages from the divisions, than under decentralization where the divisions choose their own products. Underlying this, mis-coordination is common under decentralization and divisions fail to use their information when they do coordinate. Mis-coordination is non-existent under centralization and there is a high degree of truth-telling by divisions as well. Performance under centralization is depressed by persistent sub-optimal use of information by central managers., The authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Centralized vs. decentralized management: an experimental study

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Cooper, David J.
Trabajo presentado en el GSBE-ETBC Seminar Fall 2016, organizado por la Maastricht University el 15 de septiembre de 2016, We study the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management using a new experimental game, the decentralization game. This game models an organization with two divisions and one central manager. Each division must choose or be assigned a product type. Both divisions benefit from coordinating their product types, but each prefers to coordinate on products that are close to its local tastes. The central manager aims to maximize the sum of division payoffs. Which product type achieves this goal varies with taste shocks that are known to the divisions but not the central manager. Under centralization, the central manager assigns products to divisions after receiving the divisions’ messages about the state of the world (i.e., the taste shock); under decentralization, the divisions choose their own products. Contrary to the theory, overall performance is higher under centralization than under decentralization. Communication between divisions and suggestions from central managers modestly improves performance under decentralization. Nonetheless, centralization remains the best-performing organizational form., The authors thank the National Science Foundation (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Market interactiona and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Trabajo presentado en el 42 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía celebrado en Barcelona los días 14, 15 y 16 de diciembre de 2017, We experimentally study the effects of different types of market experience on the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. Our motivation stems from the existence of contrasting views on the potential spillover effects of participation in markets on non-market activities requiring cooperation. In our set-up, market interaction takes place in a continuous double auction involving a short and a long side of the market. This feature represents the very unequal opportunities that exist in some markets. Our focus is on the comparison of the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma by pairs of individuals who were on the short side of the market, market-winners, with that of individuals who were on the long side, market-losers. We study both the cases where interaction in the social dilemma is with others from the same market, Market-Partners, and where it is with others from another market, Market-Strangers. We compare the efficiency of cooperation with and without market experience controlling for earnings, allowing us to identify the causal effects of market interaction. The results show that the experience of market interaction has a negative effect on cooperation efficiency in Market-Partners. This holds for both market-losers and market-winners pairs. By contrast, for Market-Strangers we find the positive effect that market-winner pairs tend to achieve higher cooperation efficiency than in the absence of previous market interaction., The authors thank the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Reviesed version: May 2018 (December 2015), We experimentally study causal effects of competitive market experience on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We compare behavior of pairs of traders who have been market-winners with that of pairs who have been marketlosers. We study both the cases where traders interacting in the social dilemma have competed with each other in the market before and where traders do not have a shared market experience. Shared market experience adversely affects efficiency in the social dilemma for both market-winner and market-loser pairs. Market-winners achieve higher efficiency levels in the social dilemma only if market experience is not shared., The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Supply function competition, private information and market power: a laboratory study

  • Bayona, Anna
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Vives, Xavier
In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether—as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium—costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the majority of subjects bid in accordance with the equilibrium prediction when the environment is simple (uncorrelated costs treatment) but fail to do so in a more complex environment (positively correlated costs treatment). Although we find no statistically significant differences between treatments in average behaviour and outcomes, there are significant differences in the distribution of supply functions. Our results are consistent with the presence of sophisticated agents that on average best respond to a large proportion of subjects who ignore the correlation among costs. Experimental welfare losses in both treatments are higher than the equilibrium prediction owing to a substantial degree of productive inefficiency., Anna Bayona acknowledges the financial support from Banc de Sabadell. Jordi Brandts acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR Grant 2014 SGR 510). Xavier Vives acknowledges financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2015- 63711-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR Grant 2014 SGR 1496)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Trabajo presentado en los KTI International seminar series organizados por el Centre for Economic and Regional Studies de la Hungarian Academy of Sciences, durante el 15 de junio de 2017, We experimentally study the effects of different types of market experience on the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. Our motivation stems from the existence of contrasting views on the potential spillover effects of participation in markets on non-market activities requiring cooperation. In our set-up, market interaction takes place in a continuous double auction involving a short and a long side of the market. This feature represents the very unequal opportunities that exist in some markets. Our focus is on the comparison of the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma by pairs of individuals who were on the short side of the market, market-winners, with that of individuals who were on the long side, market-losers. We study both the cases where interaction in the social dilemma is with others from the same market, Market-Partners, and where it is with others from another market, Market-Strangers. We compare the efficiency of cooperation with and without market experience controlling for earnings, allowing us to identify the causal effects of market interaction. The results show that the experience of market interaction has a negative effect on cooperation efficiency in Market-Partners. This holds for both market-losers and market-winners pairs. By contrast, for Market-Strangers we find the positive effect that market-winner pairs tend to achieve higher cooperation efficiency than in the absence of previous market interaction., The authors thank the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Social-status ranking: a hidden channel to gender inequality under competition

  • Schram, Arthur
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gërxhani, Klarita
Competition involves two main dimensions, a rivalry for resources and the ranking of relative performance. If socially recognized, the latter yields a ranking in terms of social status. The rivalry for resources resulting from competitive incentives has been found to negatively affect women’s performance relative to that of men. However, little is known about gender differences in the performance consequences of social-status ranking. In our experiments we introduce a novel design that allows us to isolate the effects of status ranking from those caused by a rivalry for resources. Subjects do a time-limited task where they need to search for numbers and add them up. Performance is straightforwardly measured by the number of correct summations. When there is no status ranking we find no gender differences in the number of attempted summations or in performance. By contrast, when there is status ranking men significantly increase the number of attempted summations as well as the number of correct summations. Remarkably, when women are subjected to status ranking, they significantly decrease the number of attempted summations. The net result is striking. With status ranking men attempt more summations and correctly solve many more than women. These differences are markedly large and statistically highly significant. Our results suggest that increased participation in competitive environments could harm women’s labor market success along a hidden channel., We also thank the Research Priority Area Behavioral Economics of the University of Amsterdam, the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) for financial support, Veronica Benet-Martinez for providing us access to the laboratory of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, and Pablo Lopez-Aguilar, Eva Maciocco, Elia Soler Pastor, Silvia Soriano and Imma Triano for help in organizing the experiments., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

  • Klijn, Flip
We study the problem of allocating projects to heterogeneous workers. The simultaneous execution of multiple projects imposes constraints across project teams. Each worker has preferences over the combinations of projects in which he can potentially participate and his team members in any of these projects. We propose a revelation mechanism that is Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof (Theorem 1). We also identify two preference domains on which the mechanism is strongly group strategy-proof (Theorem 2). Our results subsume results by Monte and Tumennasan (2013) and Kamiyama (2013) ., Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca, (Grant / Award Number: ’2014-SGR-1064’) Aix-Marseille School of Economics, (Grant / Award Number: ) Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, (Grant / Award Number: ’ECO2014-59302-P’) Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, (Grant / Award Number: ’SEV-2015-0563’)
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers

  • Hamers, Herbert
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Slikker, Marco
This paper deals with decentralized decision-making situations in which firms outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. Each firm aims to minimize the sum of its completion times. We study whether a central authority can install a mechanism such that strategic interaction leads to a socially optimal schedule. For the case of single demand the shortest-first mechanism implements optimal schedules in Nash equilibrium. We show that for the general case there exists no anonymous mechanism that implements optimal schedules in correlated equilibrium., Financial support from from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) is also gratefully acknowledged.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Life Satisfaction, Income Comparisons and Individual Traits

  • Budria, Santi
  • Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada
People gain utility from occupying a higher ranked position in the income distribution of the reference group. This paper investigates whether these gains depend on an individual's set of personality and affective traits. Using the 2000 to 2013 waves of the German Socio-economic Panel dataset (SOEP), a subjective question on Life Satisfaction, and three different measures of personal and affective traits, we find significant and robust differences across groups and conclude that traits determine the relationship between rank and life satisfaction. The heterogeneity on the importance of income comparisons is relevant, for example, when building economic models, predicting individuals' behavior, or making welfare judgments., Santiago Budria acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grants ECO2012‐33993 and ECO2012‐36480, and by the Fundación Ramón Areces (Research Project: Determinants of social exclusion and recommendations for combating it); and Ada Ferrer‐i‐Carbonell acknowledges support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant through project grant ECO2014‐59302‐P and SeveroOchoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). She gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under project reference no. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4546/2014. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project ECO2015-65701-P.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

  • Jaramillo, Paula
  • Kayi, Çagatay
  • Klijn, Flip
This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study rank-fairness within pairs of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight., The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
We experimentally study causal effects of competitive experience in markets with a short and a long side on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We find that market experience affects efficiency when traders previously competed in the same market on the same side. The effect is strong for market-loser pairs and also exists for market-winner pairs, albeit to a lesser extent. Cooperation efficiency is unaffected for pairs consisting of a market-winner and a market-loser. When traders did not interact on the same market before, efficiency of cooperation is higher for market-winner pairs, but only in the short run., The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

  • Jaramillo, Paula
  • Kayi, Çagatay
  • Klijn, Flip
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the corresponding order of pairs, at each step a rank-priority mechanism considers a rank-priority pair and matches an available student to an unfilled school if the student and the school rank and prioritize each other in accordance with the rank-priority pair. The Boston or immediate acceptance mechanism is a particular rank-priority mechanism. Our first main result is a characterization of the subfamily of rank-priority mechanisms that Nash implement the set of stable matchings (Theorem 1). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete information, no rank-priority mechanism implements the set of stable matchings (Theorem 2)., The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Vice-Presidency for Research and the Faculty of Economics of Universidad de Los Andes and the hospitality of Quantil during Fall 2019. The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P AEI/FEDER, UE, and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Distaste for Inequality? The Role of Risk Aversion

  • Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada
  • Ramos, Xavier
Risk aversion is an important argument to explain why individuals may dislike inequality. However, this relationship has not been empirically tested for large representative samples. Using a representative panel for Germany, we estimate this relationship by linking subjective well-being (a proxy for utility), inequality, and self-reported risk attitudes. The results confirm that risk aversion has a positive effect on dislike for inequality: more risk averse individuals are also more inequality averse. This relationship however is partly driven by other individual characteristics (gender, education, and income) that are correlated with risk attitudes., Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Catalan Government (01414-SGR). Xavier Ramos acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness’ project ECO2016-76506-C4-4-R), and the Catalan Government (SGR2014-1279)., Peer reviewed
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Social-status ranking, a hidden channel to gender inequality under competition

  • Schram, Arthur
  • Brandts, Jordi|||0000-0001-9082-9258
  • Gërxhani, Klarita
Competition involves two main dimensions, a rivalry for resources and the ranking of relative performance. If socially recognized, the latter yields a ranking in terms of social status. The rivalry for resources resulting from competitive incentives has been found to negatively affect women's performance relative to that of men. However, little is known about gender differences in the performance consequences of social-status ranking. In our experiments we introduce a novel design that allows us to isolate the effects of status ranking from those caused by a rivalry for resources. Subjects do a time-limited task where they need to search for numbers and add them up. Performance is straightforwardly measured by the number of correct summations. When there is no status ranking we find no gender differences in the number of attempted summations or in performance. By contrast, when there is status ranking men significantly increase the number of attempted summations as well as the number of correct summations. Remarkably, when women are subjected to status ranking, they significantly decrease the number of attempted summations. The net result is striking. With status ranking men attempt more summations and correctly solve many more than women. These differences are markedly large and statistically highly significant. Our results suggest that increased participation in competitive environments could harm women's labor market success along a hidden channel.