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EL COMPORTAMIENTO INDIVIDUAL IN GRUPOS Y MERCADOS: UNA EVALUACION EXPERIMENTAL

ECO2015-65701-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2015
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACION A DISTANCIA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study experimentally in the laboratory two 2-player games that mimic a decentralized decision-making situation in which firms repeatedly outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. The first game has a unique (inefficient) equilibrium in mixed strategies, while the second game has two (efficient) equilibria in pure strategies and an infinite number of (inefficient) equilibria in mixed strategies. In both games, the optimal social costs can also be obtained via dominated strategies. We find that only in the second game subjects manage to reach an efficient outcome more often when matched in fixed pairs than when randomly rematched each round. Surprisingly, this is because subjects coordinate on dominated strategies (and not an efficient pure strategy equilibrium). We show theoretically that preferences for efficiency cannot explain our experimental results. Inequality aversion, on the other hand, cannot be rejected., F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). He also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces. M. Vorsatz gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2012–31985 and ECO2015–65701–P)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). She gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under project reference no. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4546/2014. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project ECO2015-65701-P.
e-cienciaDatos, Repositorio de Datos del Consorcio Madroño
Research data Set de datos (Dataset)

Masculinity and Lying

  • Turiegano, Enrique
  • Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
  • Vorsatz, Marc
<p>This project explores the association between masculine physical traits and dishonesty in communication. Using a sender-receiver game, the study evaluates how markers like the second-to-fourth digit ratio (2D:4D), facial morphometric masculinity (fMM), and facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) influence lying and deception. The findings shed light on the biological roots of strategic communication and its connection to honesty and dishonesty.</p> <p>The dataset includes measurements of 2D:4D, fMM, and fWHR from 168 male participants who played a sender-receiver game. Behavioral data include lying and deception decisions, alongside demographic and physical information such as BMI & age.</p>
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Strategy-proof location of public facilities

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Vorsatz, Marc
Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules., Financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the projects ECO2015-64330-P and ECO2015-65701-P, is gratefully acknowledged.