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ANALISIS Y TECNICAS DE MEJORA DE LA ROBUSTEZ Y SEGURIDAD DE CIRCUITOS NANOMETRICOS EN PRESENCIA DE ATAQUES, DEFECTOS, VARIABILIDAD Y AGING

TEC2013-41209-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2013
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POLITECNICA DE CATALUNYA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The low area probing detector as a countermeasure against invasive attacks

  • Weiner, Michael
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa|||0000-0001-6231-0862
  • Sigl, Georg
© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works, Microprobing allows intercepting data from on-chip wires as well as injecting faults into data or control lines. This makes it a commonly used attack technique against security-related semiconductors, such as smart card controllers. We present the low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient approach to detect microprobing. It compares delay differences between symmetric lines such as bus lines to detect timing asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of a probe. Compared with state-of-the-art microprobing countermeasures from industry, such as shields or bus encryption, the area overhead is minimal and no delays are introduced; in contrast to probing detection schemes from academia, such as the probe attempt detector, no analog circuitry is needed. We show the Monte Carlo simulation results of mismatch variations as well as process, voltage, and temperature corners on a 65-nm technology and present a simple reliability optimization. Eventually, we show that the detection of state-of-the-art commercial microprobes is possible even under extreme conditions and the margin with respect to false positives is sufficient., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Unpredictable bits generation based on RRAM parallel configuration

  • Arumi Delgado, Daniel|||0000-0002-6638-7485
  • Gómez Pau, Álvaro|||0000-0002-7774-1662
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa|||0000-0001-6231-0862
  • Bargalló, Mireia
  • Campabadal, Francesca
In this letter a cell with the parallel combination of two TiN/Ti/HfO2/W resistive random access memory (RRAM) devices is studied for the generation of unpredictable bits. Measurements confirm that a simultaneous parallel SET operation in which one of the two RRAMs switches to the low resistance state (LRS) is an unpredictable process showing random properties for different sets of cells. Furthermore, given a device pair, the same device switches during subsequent write operations. The proposed cell is also analyzed under different current compliances and pulse widths with the same persistent behavior being observed. The features of the proposed cell, which provide data obfuscation without compromising reliability, pave the way for its application in Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for hardware security purposes., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Crypto-test-lab for security validation of ECC co-processor test infrastructure

  • Lupón Roses, Emilio|||0000-0001-7304-271X
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa|||0000-0001-6231-0862
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a technology for public-key cryptography that is becoming increasingly popular because it provides greater speed and implementation compactness than other public-key technologies. Calculations, however, may not be executed by software, since it would be so time consuming, thus an ECC co-processor is commonly included to accelerate the speed. Test infrastructure in crypto co-processors is often avoided because it poses serious security holes against adversaries. However, ECC co-processors include complex modules for which only functional test methodologies are unsuitable, because they would take an unacceptably long time during the production test. Therefore, some internal test infrastructure is always included to permit the application of structural test techniques. Designing a secure test infrastructure is quite a complex task that relies on the designer's experience and on trial & error iterations over a series of different types of attacks. Most of the severe attacks cannot be simulated because of the demanding computational effort and the lack of proper attack models. Therefore, prototypes are prepared using FPGAs. In this paper, a Crypto-Test-Lab is presented that includes an ECC co-processor with flexible test infrastructure. Its purpose is to facilitate the design and validation of secure strategies for testing in this type of co-processor.
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Defending cache memory against cold-boot attacks boosted by power or EM radiation analysis

  • Neagu, Madalin
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
Some algorithms running with compromised data select cache memory as a type of secure memory where data is confined and not transferred to main memory. However, cold-boot attacks that target cache memories exploit the data remanence. Thus, a sudden power shutdown may not delete data entirely, giving the opportunity to steal data. The biggest challenge for any technique aiming to secure the cache memory is performance penalty. Techniques based on data scrambling have demonstrated that security can be improved with a limited reduction in performance. However, they still cannot resist side-channel attacks like power or electromagnetic analysis. This paper presents a review of known attacks on memories and countermeasures proposed so far and an improved scrambling technique named random masking interleaved scrambling technique (RM-ISTe). This method is designed to protect the cache memory against cold-boot attacks, even if these are boosted by side-channel techniques like power or electromagnetic analysis.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Crypto-test-lab for security validation of ECC co-processor test infrastructure

  • Lupón Roses, Emilio
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a technology for public-key cryptography that is becoming increasingly popular because it provides greater speed and implementation compactness than other public-key technologies. Calculations, however, may not be executed by software, since it would be so time consuming, thus an ECC co-processor is commonly included to accelerate the speed. Test infrastructure in crypto co-processors is often avoided because it poses serious security holes against adversaries. However, ECC co-processors include complex modules for which only functional test methodologies are unsuitable, because they would take an unacceptably long time during the production test. Therefore, some internal test infrastructure is always included to permit the application of structural test techniques. Designing a secure test infrastructure is quite a complex task that relies on the designer's experience and on trial & error iterations over a series of different types of attacks. Most of the severe attacks cannot be simulated because of the demanding computational effort and the lack of proper attack models. Therefore, prototypes are prepared using FPGAs. In this paper, a Crypto-Test-Lab is presented that includes an ECC co-processor with flexible test infrastructure. Its purpose is to facilitate the design and validation of secure strategies for testing in this type of co-processor., Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Defending cache memory against cold-boot attacks boosted by power or EM radiation analysis

  • Neagu, Madalin
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
Some algorithms running with compromised data select cache memory as a type of secure memory where data is confined and not transferred to main memory. However, cold-boot attacks that target cache memories exploit the data remanence. Thus, a sudden power shutdown may not delete data entirely, giving the opportunity to steal data. The biggest challenge for any technique aiming to secure the cache memory is performance penalty. Techniques based on data scrambling have demonstrated that security can be improved with a limited reduction in performance. However, they still cannot resist side-channel attacks like power or electromagnetic analysis. This paper presents a review of known attacks on memories and countermeasures proposed so far and an improved scrambling technique named random masking interleaved scrambling technique (RM-ISTe). This method is designed to protect the cache memory against cold-boot attacks, even if these are boosted by side-channel techniques like power or electromagnetic analysis., Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Unpredictable bits generation based on RRAM parallel configuration

  • Arumi Delgado, Daniel
  • Gómez Pau, Álvaro
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa
  • Bargalló, Mireia
  • Campabadal, Francesca
In this letter a cell with the parallel combination of two TiN/Ti/HfO2/W resistive random access memory (RRAM) devices is studied for the generation of unpredictable bits. Measurements confirm that a simultaneous parallel SET operation in which one of the two RRAMs switches to the low resistance state (LRS) is an unpredictable process showing random properties for different sets of cells. Furthermore, given a device pair, the same device switches during subsequent write operations. The proposed cell is also analyzed under different current compliances and pulse widths with the same persistent behavior being observed. The features of the proposed cell, which provide data obfuscation without compromising reliability, pave the way for its application in Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for hardware security purposes., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The low area probing detector as a countermeasure against invasive attacks

  • Weiner, Michael
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa
  • Sigl, Georg
© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works, Microprobing allows intercepting data from on-chip wires as well as injecting faults into data or control lines. This makes it a commonly used attack technique against security-related semiconductors, such as smart card controllers. We present the low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient approach to detect microprobing. It compares delay differences between symmetric lines such as bus lines to detect timing asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of a probe. Compared with state-of-the-art microprobing countermeasures from industry, such as shields or bus encryption, the area overhead is minimal and no delays are introduced; in contrast to probing detection schemes from academia, such as the probe attempt detector, no analog circuitry is needed. We show the Monte Carlo simulation results of mismatch variations as well as process, voltage, and temperature corners on a 65-nm technology and present a simple reliability optimization. Eventually, we show that the detection of state-of-the-art commercial microprobes is possible even under extreme conditions and the margin with respect to false positives is sufficient., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)