RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación
Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from prisoner&apos, s dilemma to snowdrift
[EN] The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary
problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner s
Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed
this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of
cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the
number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if
the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear,
PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve
into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size
is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral
ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear
advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and
ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level
production of public goods., Work was supported by grants to L.C. from the National Science Foundation (DEB-1354253) and to S.F.E. from Spain's Ministries of Education, Culture and Sport (Salvador de Madariaga Programme PRX15/00149) and Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (BFU2015-65037-P), Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/021) and the European Commission 7th Framework Programme EvoEvo Project (grant ICT-610427)