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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for their contributions to the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The theory of stable allocations consists of a family of models that study assignment problems in which two disjoint sets of agents (or a set of agents and a set of objects) have to be matched. For example, men to women, workers to firms, students to schools, or patients to live donor kidneys. A matching is stable if no subset of agents can improved upon their proposed matches by rematching only among themselves. Stability is an essential property if matching is voluntary. The practice of market design consists of applying those two-sided matching models to specific assignment problems with the aim of proposing improvements on how they are solved. This paper presents a brief description of the academic career of the laureates and describes their contributions by presenting the most basic two-sided matching model and some of its market design applications, including the organization of a centralized system to propose kidney transplantations to use kidneys of live donors that are incompatible with their respective patients, the yearly assignment of North-American medical students to hospital internship programs, and children to schools in cities such as Boston and New York. [Contrib Sci 11(1): 103-112 (2015)]
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik's (1971) assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability, and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related to the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated with the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of matrices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common prior, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems, The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference profile, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference profile if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like efficiency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships, Strategy-proofness

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness

  • Catterji, Shurojit
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Comparing Voting by Committees According to their Manipulability

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships, Internal Stability and Consistency

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation.