DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication
Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)
Preference shock and party consistency
Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016, I develop a two party electoral competition model in order to analyze the effects of an exogenous
preference shock on the strategic policy choice of parties. I find that on the one hand, if the preference
shock affects the issue that is currently most salient, then both parties strategically shift their policy
choices in the direction of the shock, however the shifts are asymmetric: the policy shift of the party
that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. On the other hand, if the preference shock
affects an issue that was not the most salient before and becomes salient because of the shock itself,
then both parties strategically shift their policy choices towards the ideal point of the median voter of
that issue. And again, the parties policy shift is asymmetric: the reaction of the party that is most
favored by the preference shock is smaller. Finally, I show that the effects of a large policy shift that
some parties perform when they are optimally reacting to a voters’ preference shocks may break the
party’s internal equilibrium among its different factions, implying that exogenous preference shocks
may cause important chanegs in a pary system, Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2015-67171-P and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through
SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed