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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

PID2020-116771GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2020
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 12
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow's impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Chatterji, Shurojit
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The rate of surplus value and the structure of the tax system

  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
The objective of this work is twofold. First, it aims to establish procedures for approximating the rate of surplus value using disaggregated data published by statistical agencies. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it highlights that the dynamics of the rate of surplus value should be regarded as a preferred indicator for assessing the effects of public policies, particularly taxation. This is because not all taxes impact the rate equally. To illustrate the potential of this analytical approach, we employ recent data from Spain, organized in a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mixture-betweenness, uncertainty and commitment

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper develops axiomatic models of preference under uncertainty and preference for commitment that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness, a weakening of the Independence axiom originally proposed by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986). A central contribution of the paper is a general representation theorem that can be applied across a wide range of domains.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Food losses and waste, a needed assessment for future policies

  • Campoy-Muñoz, Pilar|||0000-0003-4163-3907
  • Cardenete Flores, Manuel Alejandro
  • Delgado, María del Carmen|||0000-0002-9343-665X
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
About one third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted. For this reason, food losses and waste has become a key priority within worldwide policy circles. This is a major global issue that not only threatens the viability of a sustainable food system but also generates negative externalities in environmental terms. The avoidance of this forbidding wastage would have a positive economic impact on national economies in terms of resource savings. In this paper we look beyond this somewhat traditional resource savings angle and we shift the focus to explore the distributional consequences of food losses and waste reduction using a resource constrained modeling perspective. The impact due to the behavioral shift of each household is therefore explained by two factors. One is the amount of resources saved when the behavioral shift takes place, whereas the other one has to do with the position of households in the food supply chain. By considering the whole supply chain, instead of the common approach based only in reducing waste by consumers, we enrich the empirical knowledge of this issue and improve the quantification of its economic impact. We examine data for three EU countries that present different economic structures (Germany, Spain and Poland) so as to have a broader and more robust viewpoint of the potential results. We find that distributional effects are different for consumers and producers and also across countries. Our results could be useful for policymakers since they indicate that policies should not be driven merely by the size waste but rather on its position within the food supply chain.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

(Not) Addressing Issues in Electoral Campaigns

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent's position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates' strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenomena observed during campaigns, like the convergence of the parties to address the same issues, or else their diverging choice on which ones to treat, or the relevance of issue ownership can be explained within our stark basic model. Most importantly, our analysis is based on a novel concept of equilibrium that avoids the (often arbitrary) use of predetermined protocols. This allows us to endogenously predict not only the list of topics that will be touched upon by each candidate, but also the order in which they will be addressed.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Deciding on what to decide

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules, Local and weakly single-peaked domains

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Pablo
We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An elementary proof of the existence of the Leontief inverse

  • Pinyol, Conxita
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
We provide a new and simpler proof for the existence and non-negativity of the Leontief inverse that does not rely on advanced mathematics. Instead, we start from an economic condition related to the equilibrium in quantities between demand and supply and proceed using only elementary linear algebra to establish the nature of the inverse.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences

  • Fioravanti, Federico
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters' preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.