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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Caminal, Ramón
Trabajo presentado en la 17th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, celebrada en Faro, Portugal del 25 al 30 de junio de 2017.-- Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016.-- Trabajo presentado en el EEA Esem (2017): (32ne Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 70th European Meeting of the Econometric Society), celebrado en Lisboa del 21 al 25 de agosto de 2017, We propose a new solution concept for TU cooperative games in characteristic function form, the SCOOP, that builds on the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), adding to it a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition. The SCOOP speciÖes the probability of success and the payo§s to each coalition. Players share the surplus of a coalition according to the NBS, with disagreement payo§s that are computed as the expectation of payo§s in other coalitions, using some common probability distribution, which in turn is derived from the prior distribution. The predicted outcome can be probabilistic or deterministic, but only an e¢ cient coalition can succeed with probability one. We discuss necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an e¢ cient solution. In either case, the SCOOP always exists, is generically unique for superadditive games, and easy to compute. Moreover, in the spirit of the Nash program, we propose a reasonable non-cooperative protocol whose stationary equilibrium identiÖes the SCOOP as the limit equilibrium outcome, We acknowledge the support of the Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness (ECO2017-88129-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR1136)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Reviesed version: May 2018 (December 2015), We experimentally study causal effects of competitive market experience on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We compare behavior of pairs of traders who have been market-winners with that of pairs who have been marketlosers. We study both the cases where traders interacting in the social dilemma have competed with each other in the market before and where traders do not have a shared market experience. Shared market experience adversely affects efficiency in the social dilemma for both market-winner and market-loser pairs. Market-winners achieve higher efficiency levels in the social dilemma only if market experience is not shared., The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Targeted advertising and costly consumer search

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Petrikaité, Vaiva
Trabajo presentado en el 87th SEA (Southern Economic Association) Annual Meeting, celebrada en Tampa, Florida, del 17 al 19 de noviembre de 2017, We study a model of advertising targeting based on information about the consumer’s likely ranking of products. With horizontally differentiated goods and costly search, ads then convey to consumers a noisy, positive signal of their unknown willingness to pay for the firms’ products. That implies a higher expected willingness to pay for a yet not sampled firm, which increases the incentives to search, but also a lower expected differentiation of the products that the consumers learn about, which reduces the incentives to search. The first effect is more important for lower search costs, and the second for larger number of products. Also, the equilibrium intensity of advertising will affect the precision of consumers’ information. Larger marginal cost of advertising results in larger endogenous segmentation and larger prices., The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), grants No. ECO2014-59959-P and No. ECO2015-74328-JIN (AEI/FEDER/UE), and 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Government debt management: the long and the short of it

  • Faraglia, Elisa
  • Marcet, Albert
  • Oikonomou, Rigas
  • Scott, Andrew
Trabajo presentado en el 8th Shanghai Macroeconomics Workshop, celebrado en Shanghai (China), del 17 al 19 de junio de 2017.--Trabajo presentado en el Government Debt: Constraints and Choices, organizado por la Universidad de Chicago durante los días 21 y 22 de abril de 2017.--This version: October 2018 (November 2014), Standard optimal Debt Management (DM) models prescribe a dominant role for long bonds and advocate against issuing short bonds. They require very large positions in order to complete markets and assume each period that governments repurchase all outstanding bonds and reissue ( r/r ) new ones. These features of DM are inconsistent with US data. We introduce incomplete markets via small transaction costs which serves to make optimal DM more closely resemble the data : r/r are negligible, short bond issuance substantial and persistent and short and long bonds positively co-vary. Intuitively long bonds help smooth taxes over states and short bonds over time. Solving incomplete market models with multiple assets is challenging so a further contribution of this paper is introducing a novel computational method to find global solutions., Faraglia gratefully acknowledges support from the Cambridge Endowment of Research in Finance (CERF), Marcet from Plan Nacional (Spanish Ministry of Science), Monfispol, AGAUR (Generalitat de Catalunya), the Axa Foundation, the Excellence Program of Banco de Espa˜na, European Research Council under the EU 7th Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) Advanced ERC Grant Agreement n. 324048 - APMPAL and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Scott from the ESRCs World Economy and Finance program., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Optimal debt maturity and firm investment

  • Jungherr, Joachim
  • Schott, Immo
Trabajo presentado en el ADEMU Summer School celebrado en Toulousse, los días 19 y 20 de junio de 2017.--, Trabajo presentado en el EUI Macro Working Group, organizado por el Departamento de Económicas del European University Institute (Italia), el 16 de febrero de 2017, This paper introduces a maturity choice to the standard model of firm financing and investment. Long-term debt renders the optimal firm policy time-inconsistent. Lack of commitment gives rise to debt dilution. This problem becomes more severe during downturns. We show that cyclical debt dilution generates the observed counter-cyclical behavior of default, bond spreads, leverage, and debt maturity. It also generates the pro-cyclical term structure of corporate bond spreads. Debt dilution renders the equilibrium outcome constrained-inefficient: credit spreads are too high and investment is too low. In two policy experiments we find the following: (1) an outright ban of long-term debt improves welfare in our model economy, and (2.) debt dilution accounts for 84% of the credit spread and 25% of the welfare gap with respect to the first best allocation., Joachim Jungherr is grateful for financial support from the ADEMU project funded by the European Union (Horizon 2020 Grant 649396), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through Grant ECO2013-48884-C3-1P, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant 2014 SGR 1432)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Liberté, Égalité, ... Religiosité

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
In this paper we study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and over the legal restrictions on personal liberties. Religious teachings generally restrict individual behavior on issues such as consumption of some goods, sexual orientation, divorce, abortion, gay marriage, contraception and so on. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality experienced when others in society practice those liberties beyond what he deems adequate. The first assumption implies that, when the law allows for the use of liberties, secular individuals have a higher incentive to work than religious ones. As a result, the political choice of legal restrictions on liberties has an impact on income inequality. The second implies that religious individuals may prefer to repress liberties in society. As repression of liberties reduces income inequality, poor religious individuals may still prefer low taxes compared with richer and less religious ones. We also analyze the choice of redistribution and the legal cap on liberties as the majoritarian outcome in a citizen-candidate model. We obtain that when the majority of the population is religious and the religious cleavage in society is large, high intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of liberties and relatively low income taxes., Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support ´ from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015 − 66883−P, Generalitat de Catalunya project number 2017SGR1359, and the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370, Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Deliberative structures and their impact on voting behavior under social conflict

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
Trabajo presentado en el European Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (EWEBE), organizado por la Universidad de Bologna los días 26 y 27 de mayo de 2017 con el título: The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavio.--Trabajo presentado en los Bilkent Microeconomics Seminars organizados por la Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey) el día 29 de noviembre de 2017, Inequalities in democracies are multi-faceted. They not only incorporate differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information and social influence. In a lab experiment, we study the interaction of these inequalities to provide a better understanding of socio-political tensions in modern societies. We identify the tragedy of the elite, the dilemma that privileged access to information about a fundamental state that mediates political conflict creates lying incentives for the better informed. In our experiment, an electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the world. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. We study four different communication protocols which vary the access to communication channels of the two groups and are meant to represent societies with different degrees of openness. We hypothesize that the deliberative structures affect group identities, preferences, and voting. Our observed outcomes largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair as well as from the Graduate School of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Universit¨at Hamburg., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

The survival and demise of the state: a dynamic theory of secessions

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Flamand, Sabine
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Rohner, Dominic
This paper analizes the repeated interaction between groups in a country as a repeated Stackelberg game, where conflict and secession can occur on the equilibrium path owing to commitment problems. If a group out of power is small enough and its contribution to total surplus not too large, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period. When there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict can occur. While in the static model secession can occur only as a peaceful outcome, in the infinite horizon game with high discount factor secession may result following costly conflict. We discuss our full characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the light of the available empirical evidence., Joan Esteban gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015−66883−P, from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR1359, and from National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370. Massimo Morelli wishes to thank the European Research Council, advanced grant 694583. Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595., Peer reviewed
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Robust design in monotonic matching markets, a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals this means not being able to provide full service to its patients. A huge literature has advocated the use of stable mechanisms for clearinghouses. The interests among workers and firms are polarized among stable mechanisms, most famously the firm-proposing DA and the worker-proposing DA. We show that for the firmproposing DA ex-ante incentive compatibility and ex-post incentive compatibility are equivalent whereas this is not necessarily true for the worker-proposing DA. The firm-proposing DA turns out to be more robust than the worker-proposing DA under incomplete information when incentives of both sides of the market are important.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Ordinal relative satisficing behavior, theory and experiments

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Neme, Alejandro
We propose a notion of r-rationality, a relative version of satisficing behavior based on the idea that, for any set of available alternatives, individuals choose one of their r-best according to a single preference. We fully characterize the choice functions satisfying the condition for any r, and provide an algorithm to compute the maximal degree of r-rationality associated with any given choice function. The notion is extended to individuals whose r may vary with the set of available alternatives. We provide experimental evidence that the predictive power of our theory, measured by Seltenís index, improves upon that of alternative ones.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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Order-k rationality

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • de Clippel, Geoffroy
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Rozen, Kareen
A decision maker (DM) may not perfectly maximize her preference over the feasible set. She may feel it is good enough to maximize her preference over a sufficiently large consideration set; or just require that her choice is sufficiently well-ranked (e.g., in the top quintile of options); or even endogenously determine a threshold for what is good enough, based on an initial sampling of the options. Heuristics such as these are all encompassed by a common theory of order-k rationality, which relaxes perfect optimization by only requiring choices from a set S to fall within the set's top k(S) elements according to the DM's preference ordering. Heuristics aside, this departure from rationality offers a natural way, in the classic 'as if' tradition, to gradually accommodate more choice patterns as k increases. We characterize the empirical content of order-k rationality (and related theories), and provide a tractable testing method which is comparable to the method of checking SARP
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Regime change in large information networks

  • Milán, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • de Martí, Joan
We study global games of regime change within networks of truthful communication. Agents can choose between attacking and not attacking a status quo, whose strength is unknown. Players share private signals on this state of the world with their immediate neighbors. Communication with neighboring players introduces local correlations in posterior beliefs and also allows for the pooling of information. In order to isolate the latter effect, we provide, as a methodological contribution, sparseness conditions on networks that allow for asymptotic approximations that eliminate covariances from equilibrium strategies. We ask how changes in the distribution of connectivities in the population affect the types of coordination in equilibrium as well as the likelihood of successful rally. We find that without a public signal strategic incentives align, and the probability of success remains independent of the type of network. With a public signal the distribution of degrees unambiguously affects the probability of success, although the direction of change is not monotone, and depends crucially on the cost of attack.
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Search and matching in the labor market without unemployment insurance

  • Obiols Homs, Francesc|||0000-0003-2316-0288
I study the effect of the market arrangement on competitive allocations in a model in which the distribution of idiosyncratic uncertainty is determined endogenously. The particular application I consider is a search model of the labor market embedded in a general equilibrium model with production and asset accumulation. It is shown that costly search with incomplete markets introduces a wealth effect at low levels of wealth such that poor agents do not search much or even find optimal not to look for a job. The combination of this effect with the usual one at higher wealth levels delivers equilibrium allocations that are remarkably different from the one that obtains under complete markets. I also use numerical methods to obtain quantitative predictions in a calibrated version of the model. The effect of the market arrangement remains dramatically large due to search externalities.
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On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.