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Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Risk analysis sampling methods in terrorist networks based on the Banzhaf value

  • Algaba Durán, Encarnación
  • Prieto, Andrea
  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
This article introduces the Banzhaf and the Banzhaf–Owen values as novel measures of risk analysis of a terrorist attack, determining the most dangerous terrorists in a network. This new approach counts with the advantage of integrating at the same time the complete topology (i.e., nodes and edges) of the network and a coalitional structure on the nodes of the network. More precisely, the characteristics of the nodes (e.g., terrorists) of the network and their possible relationships (e.g., types of communication links), as well as coalitional information (e.g., level of hierarchies) independent of the network. First, for these two new measures of risk analysis, we provide and implement approximation algorithms. Second, as illustration, we rank the members of the Zerkani network, responsible for the attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016). Finally, we give a comparison between the rankings established by the Banzhaf and the Banzhaf–Owen values as measures of risk analysis
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C31, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ | Ref. PID2022-137211NB-100, Comunidad Valenciana | Ref. PROMETEO/2021/063, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/14, Universidade da Coruña/CISUG
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6, [Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions to improve this article. This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grants PGC2018-097965-B-100, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, MTM2014-54199-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the European Regional Development Fund (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG, [Absctract]: In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., This work is part of the R+D+I project grants MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, PGC2018-097965-B-I00, PID2021-124030NB-C31, PID2021-124030NB-C33 and PID2022-137211NB-100, that were funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research was also funded by project PROMETEO/2021/063 from the Comunidad Valenciana, and by Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2020/03 and ED431C-2020/14 from the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Universidades, Xunta de Galicia. Funding for open access charge: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG . The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have contributed to the improvement of this article., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/14, Generalitat Valenciana; PROMETEO/2021/063